Cooperation and the Development of Joint Commitment by Kachel, Ulrike
 
 
 
Cooperation and the Development of Joint Commitment 
 
 
Von  der  Fakultät  für Lebenswissenschaften 
 
der Universität Leipzig 
 
genehmigte 
 
D I S S E R T A T I O N 
 
zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades 
 
Doctor rerum naturalium 
 
Dr. rer.nat. 
 
 
vorgelegt 
 
von Frau M.Sc. Psych Ulrike Kachel 
 
 
geboren am 05.01.1988, in Leinefelde 
 
 
 
 
Dekan: Prof. Dr. Tilo Pompe 
 
 
Gutachter: Prof. Dr. Daniel Haun 
 
Prof. Dr. Stephen A. Butterfill 
 
 
Tag der Verteidigung 13.06.2019  
  
 
i  
BIBLIOGRAPHISCHE DARSTELLUNG 
Ulrike Kachel 
Young Children’s Understanding of Joint Commitments  
Fakultät für Lebenswissenschaften 
Universität Leipzig 
Dissertation 
134 Seiten, 151 Literaturangaben, 15 Abbildungen, 2 Tabellen 
 
Through cooperation, it is possible to achieve goals that are impossible to 
accomplish as an individual. However, there are also risks that lie in 
cooperation. A partner might be tempted to abandon a joint endeavor. 
Forming joint commitments can help to reduce the uncertainty and 
facilitate cooperation.  
The first study, explored children’s reactions to a partner’s failure to 
perform their role in a joint commitment. Three-year-olds showed more 
protest against a partner who defected selfishly and knowingly, but 
restrained from protest if a partner stopped cooperating due to a reason 
outside of his control. Interestingly, they also tried to teach their partner if 
he appeared willing but incompetent. In the second study, I investigated 
whether 3- and 5-year-olds could be bribed to abandon a collaborative 
partner who relies on them, a dependent partner with whom they made an 
explicit joint commitment, or an independent partner. Children of both ages 
showed some level of commitment to their partner in the face of alternative 
individual rewards if an explicit joint commitment was formed. However, 
only 5-year-olds understood a partner’s dependence as a binding obligation. 
The third study asked whether children understand the dissolvability of 
joint commitments and explored their reaction to a partner’s disengagement 
from a joint task depending on how the partner dissolves the commitment. 
Children accepted a partner’s disengagement after a proper and joint 
revocation and resented a partner who just left the task or did not dissolve 
appropriately.  
Taken together, the studies demonstrate that at 3 years of age, children 
understand the obligations that lie within an explicit joint commitment 
both when it is owed to them and when they owe it to a partner. 
Competencies regarding more implicit and situational commitments seem 
to develop later at around 5 years of age. 
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1 General Introduction 
To achieve goals that cannot be achieved by one individual alone, working 
together is an elementary behavior in human’s everyday life. The ability to 
coordinate and cooperate with other individuals is one of the defining features of 
human beings, distinguishing us from other species (Melis & Semmann, 2010; 
Tomasello, 2014). Although some forms of cooperation are necessary and prevalent 
in many species (e.g., cooperative hunting in chimpanzees, Boesch, 2002), the scale 
of human cooperation and prosocial behavior is truly special and goes beyond 
cooperation with related individuals (kin selection) or within close social 
relationships as in cooperative breeding (Hamilton, 1964a, 1964b; Trivers, 1971). 
We help our elderly neighbor across the street, we practice for and perform 
concerts in an orchestra or we donate blood to help someone that we have never 
met and who will most likely never learn whose blood just helped to save their life. 
Furthermore, the very functioning of our modern societies with its conventions, 
division of labor and cultural and public institutions rely immensely on 
cooperation. As a plausible evolutionary origin of this uniquely human cooperation, 
collaborative hunting and food gathering have been discussed repeatedly (Alvard, 
2003; Bramble & Lieberman, 2004; Hill, 2002; Liebenberg, 2008; Tomasello, Melis, 
Tennie, Wyman, & Herrmann, 2012).  
However profitable the potential of cooperation might be, there are also 
problems and risks associated with it. When one partner starts to engage in 
collaboration, for example by investing individual resources like time and effort or 
turning down another potentially fruitful opportunity in favor of cooperation1,  
there is always the possibility that the other partner abandons the collaboration 
and, thereby, puts everything to waste that the first agent has invested. And in 
cooperative groups that are too large to keep track of who participated and who 
deserves to get a share from the spoils of collaboration, there is the risk of 
                                               
1 A classic example is the “stag hunt” scenario, (Skyrms, 2004) - a game theoretical model where 
two individuals are better off hunting a fertile stag collaboratively than less rewarding hares 
individually, but have to face the risk of getting nothing if they chose collaboration but their partner 
does not. 
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exploitation by free riders (Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Tomasello et al., 2012). To secure 
that cooperation remains stable and profitable with regard to the invested 
resources of each collaborator, forming joint commitments to the joint goals can be 
key. Joint commitments seem to create the feeling of a normative obligation to do 
everything in one’s power (within reasonable boundaries of course) to support the 
endeavor and, thereby, prevent individuals from giving in to temptations to defect 
from the pursuit of the joint goal (Gilbert, 1990). 
Developmental research has shown that young children engage in joint 
activities from very early on and become skillful collaborators by 2 to 3 years of 
age (first in interaction with adults, later also with peers). Around the same time, 
we see first evidence for the development of an understanding of joint 
commitments. 
With my thesis I want to contribute to a broader picture of young children’s 
understanding of joint commitments and of how they can help children to stabilize 
cooperation. First, I present a theoretical background on cooperation and some 
philosophical underpinnings of human cooperation. Next, I will provide an 
evolutionary account of uniquely human cooperation by summarizing the 
Interdependence Hypothesis (Tomasello et al., 2012). I will then go on and describe 
joint commitments and how they structure cooperation. After that, I will review 
research directly investigating young children’s understanding of cooperative 
activities and in particular their understanding of joint commitments. In the 
following chapter, I will derive my research questions and give an overview of the 
studies reported in this thesis. In chapters two to four, I will then describe three 
empirical studies, each including a theoretical introduction, a detailed 
methodological description, a report of the obtained results, and a discussion. A 
general summary of my empirical work will then conclude this thesis. 
1.1 Cooperation – a note on terminology 
When thinking about human cooperation, the first thing that comes to mind is 
usually a simple small-scale situation where two people do something together 
that they each cannot achieve by themselves. For example, imagine two people 
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moving a heavy object (too heavy for each of them alone) out of their way in order 
to be able to move forward. In this example, both agents invest an equal amount 
of resources (physical labor in that case) and both gain equally from this kind of 
cooperation. Of course, in real life, there is much more variety (e.g., the number of 
agents that are involved in the cooperative endeavor). Furthermore, the scale can 
range between scenarios where only one individual is investing without benefitting 
whereas the other - if at all - only passively cooperates and profits (typically called 
altruism or helping, Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003) and scenarios in which all 
individuals involved invest and benefit equally. Within the scope of this thesis and 
the empirical work contained in it the focus will be on situations where two 
individuals are cooperating, where both investments and benefits are spread 
equally or identically between individuals, and situations where the involved 
individuals depend on each other to reach the joint goal. In the literature and 
especially in empirical studies, the described cooperative scenario, is often referred 
to as a collaborative situation.  
Whether the two terms cooperation and collaboration are used to describe 
slightly different concepts or whether they are used rather interchangeably 
depends mostly on the research area. For example, Roschelle and Teasley (1995) 
from an educational research background define cooperation and collaboration as 
follows: 
„…cooperative work accomplished by the division of labor among 
participants, as an activity where each person is responsible for a portion of 
the problem solving...”  
„...collaboration as mutual engagement of participants in a coordinated 
effort to solve the problem together.”  
(Roschelle and Teasley, 1995, p. 70)  
Thus, when the concepts cooperation and collaboration are not used 
interchangeably, using the term cooperation (co-operate) usually refers to acts 
where individuals work together (operate) towards a higher-level joint goal by each 
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pursuing a lower level individual goal, whereas using the term collaboration (co-
labor) refers to acts where individuals work together (labor) towards a joint higher-
level goal (a single shared goal) without a division of the higher goal into lower-
level sub-goals (see also Tuomela’s (2007) distinction of cooperation in the “We-
mode” and cooperation in the “I-mode”, in Chapter 1.2.2). Since the distinction is 
not essential in the context of this thesis, I am using both terms interchangeably. 
Methodically, I deployed paradigms where a division into sub-goals for individuals 
is not necessary and one where a division into sub-goals for individuals is 
necessary. Generally, in developmental psychology, the emphasis lies more on the 
feature that both terms manifest, namely, that working together enables the 
achievement of goals that cannot be attained by each individual on their own - 
mutualistically costly and beneficial to all involved agents (in contrast to altruistic 
acts - costly for a single individual but beneficial for others). 
1.2 Theoretical perspectives on cooperative actions 
Collaboration and joint action have been a prominent topic in analytical 
philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century. For a conceptual analysis 
of the underpinnings of commitments in collaborative activities, the following 
section will briefly review some of the most prominent proposals in the literature 
that are relevant to successful cooperation and the social formation of joint 
commitments.  
1.2.1 Michael Bratman on defining features of a shared activity 
Michael Bratman (1992), postulates three features that a shared activity 
should comprise in order to count as collaborative: (i) Mutual responsiveness, 
meaning that partners are coordinating and adjusting their behavior, (ii) 
Commitment to the joint activity, meaning that partners are committed and 
willing to perform actions that are necessary in order to achieve the shared goal, 
and, (iii) Commitment to mutual support, meaning that partners should be ready 
to support each other in their roles when necessary. Let us return to the example 
of two people carrying a heavy object. In order to be successful they must 
coordinate that each partner grabs the object on different sides and that they 
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adjust their pace while carrying the object (mutual responsivity), each partner 
must in fact apply enough strength to lift and move the heavy object for the 
relevant distance (Commitment to the joint activity) and each partner must be 
ready to, for example, let their partner know if there is an obstacle in the way that 
the other has to bypass (Commitment to mutual support). It follows that in 
Bratman’s account commitments (to the joint activity as well as commitment to 
mutual support) are prerequisites for defining actions as truly collaborative. 
1.2.2 Raimo Tuomela on social modes of cooperation 
Raimo Tuomela (2007), distinguishes cooperation in the “We-mode” and 
cooperation in the “I-mode”. Cooperation in the “We-mode” is comprised of a 
collective goal that all members of a collaborative group share and that is sought 
by everyone involved above any individual goals that each member might have. In 
this mode, agents act primarily for the sake of the jointness in the joint activity. 
As a good example one could think of a group of dancers that practice to perform 
in perfect synchrony or, anticipating chapter 1.3.1., two people enjoying to take a 
walk together (Gilbert, 1990). Cooperation in the “I-mode”, on the other hand, is 
characterized by the individual goals of each member of the collaborative group. In 
this “I-mode” agents’ primary reason to engage in collaboration is a means to an 
individual end. To come back to the initial example of two people moving a heavy 
object, let’s say you and me are facing a heavy object that blocks our only exit. My 
individual goal then would involve getting the heavy thing out of my way, 
accepting that the necessary collaboration to reach my individual goal at the same 
time gets the thing out of your way, too. Now, if there were two exits (one that is 
of interest for me and one that is of interest for you) blocked by the heavy thing, in 
the “I-mode” the collaborative goal is fulfilled as soon as we moved the objects 
enough for my exit to be cleared, whereas in the “We-mode” the goal of the 
collaboration is reached only if both, my exit and your exit are cleared. Thus, 
Tuomela’s account allows for collaboration to occur in an ”I-mode” without shared 
goals. However, only cooperation in “We-mode” is characterized by a mutual 
commitment to a joint goal. 
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1.2.3 John R. Searle on the role of shared intentions in joint action 
John R. Searle (1990), adds another philosophical consideration: the underlying 
intention. He argues, a behavior qualifies as a cooperative behavior only when each 
individual’s intention to express the presumably collaborative behavior arises from 
the shared intention to actually act collaboratively:  
“I am doing what I am doing as part of our doing what we are doing.” 
 (Searle, 2005, p. 6) 
As an example, he describes a situation where people are sitting on the grass 
in a park and all of a sudden start to run towards a gazebo in the center of the 
lawn (Searle, 1990). If they happened to show this behavior because it just started 
to rain and they each are trying to find shelter under the pavilion – this would 
obviously not count as cooperative behavior. Even though it appears cooperative 
with everyone moving in a coordinated fashion (all at the same time) and with 
mutual responsiveness (adjusting their running to not to bump into each other), 
every individual in that case has their individual goal to escape the rain. If, 
however, the same group of people is showing the exact same behavior as part of 
let’s say a flash mob (with or without the rain), then this would count as a 
cooperative action.  
1.2.4 Stephen L. Darwall and the second-personal standpoint 
Furthermore, it seems important that the interaction partners understand 
each other as equals and as equally competent moral agents who treat their 
collaborative partners as competent moral agents, too (which is not the case in 
interaction with a machine like a robot or in interaction with a dog). In moral 
philosophy, Stephan L. Darwall (2006), emphasizes the second-personal 
standpoint. He claims moral behavior like sticking to one’s word or standing by 
one’s commitment is possible through an equal accountability among free and 
rational beings (‘second- personal agents’) who treat each other with mutual 
respect and as equally deserving. So, I treat you with respect and expect the same 
for myself as we uphold a common second-person authority and competence. And 
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should you not uphold I will demand it and hold you accountable just as I would 
accept you to demand it from me and hold me accountable.  
Now, after looking closely at theoretical characteristics of cooperation outlined 
in the reflections above, one might start to wonder how a behavior so complex as 
human cooperation could have evolved (Nowak, 2006; Rand & Nowak, 2013).  
1.3 An evolutionary perspective on cooperation - the Interdependence Hypothesis  
Persistence hunting is debated to be the oldest hunting strategy in humans 
(Alvard, 2003; Bramble & Lieberman, 2004; Hill, 2002; Liebenberg, 2008). It 
traditionally involves no employment of hunting dogs, weapons or other artifacts. 
Luis Liebenberg accompanied a group of hunters from Lone Tree in the central 
Kalahari as they were performing such persistence hunts. He reports the following: 
“The hunt takes place during the hottest time of the day, with maximum 
temperatures of about 39–42 C. Before starting, the hunters drink as much 
water as they can. Then they run up to the animal, which quickly flees, and 
track its foot- prints at a running pace. Meanwhile, the animal will have 
stopped to rest in the shade. The hunters must find the animal and chase it 
before it has rested long enough. This process is repeated until the animal 
is run to exhaustion.”  
      (Liebenberg, 2006, p. 1017) 
This example perfectly illustrates the perils and payoffs of small-scale mutual 
cooperation and the necessary commitment to the joint goal. It is an immense cost 
for an individual to run after prey for hours under these conditions. At the same 
time, the animal needs to be chased constantly so as not to get any rest. All efforts 
will be wasted, if only one of the hunters refuses to take their turn in the hunt. 
While joint hunts have been observed in the wild in many species, it might be 
argued that the long-term coordination required for persistence hunting is a 
striking feature that is easily afforded by joint commitments. 
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In his evolutionary theory of the development of uniquely human cooperation, 
the Interdependence Hypothesis, Tomasello and colleagues postulate two key steps 
that had to be taken and which I will briefly summarize below (Tomasello et al., 
2012; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013; Tomasello 2016). According to Tomasello, the two 
steps can be tracked in both human phylogeny and ontogeny. 
Phylogenetically, Tomasello suggests that humans are biologically adapted for 
small-scale cooperation. In the first step, which is situated at about 400,000 years 
ago, an ecological change in the environment forced early humans to 
mutualistically forage for food or starve. When individually obtainable food 
resources became more and more scarce and humans couldn’t rely on them 
anymore, they became increasingly dependent on each other by being forced to 
collaboratively acquire their daily meals. Let us imagine the example above from 
Liebenberg as a stag hunt scenario. When there were no more ‘hares’ around for 
individuals to collect, it became obligatory to find a skillful partner and hunt the 
stag (a persistence hunt in the case of the example). This small-scale 
interdependence with its immediate collaborative partners was accompanied by 
the development of new forms of behavior. It became important to help a 
collaborative partner and make sure he is in good shape for tomorrow, thereby, 
making sure that the joint endeavor will be successful. Defection (cheating or free-
riding) was not an option, because it would have been detected immediately. 
Furthermore, it was not only essential to choose a skillful partner but also to be 
chosen by others and hence, to be perceived as and having a reputation of a skillful 
and cooperative partner (Engelmann & Fischbacher, 2009; Fehr, 2004; Milinski, 
Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002a, 2002b; Sperber & Baumard, 2012; Sylwester & 
Roberts, 2010). This partner choice mechanism and the punishment of violations 
of social norms and betrayal of cooperative relations served as a control against 
cheating and free-riding (Baumard, Andre, & Sperber, 2013; Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004a, 2004b). For example, when you take both your share and my share after we 
ran down the stag in the heat of the day for several hours, certainly I will never 
call for you as my partner ever again when I see a stag next time. And, everyone 
who sees me returning exhausted but hungry or who hears about our hunting story 
will be reluctant at recruiting you either. So, when bad cooperators were excluded 
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in such a social selection process, Tomasello argues, not just having the reputation 
of being a good cooperator, but actually acting as and being a good cooperator was 
the survival strategy2. Thus, the Interdependence Hypothesis suggests that 
human cooperation and costly altruistic behavior like sharing and helping may be 
a by-product of the evolution of a collaborative hunting strategy. 
In the second step, which Tomasello situates at about 100,000 years ago, these 
new collaborative skills and motivations were scaled up to the group level which 
ultimately resulted in group-wide norms, conventions and institutions or even 
something that we call culture today. The idea is that the small-scale groups that 
had successfully worked out their second-personal collaboration were then 
threatened by and had to compete with other groups. Furthermore, the groups 
became too big for a mechanism like partner choice to prevent cheating and 
freeriding. Here, internalized group-specific norms (e.g., we are sharing equally) 
and conventions (e.g., we hunt at dawn) stabilize groups from within and distance 
them from competing outsiders. Then, cultural group selection favored groups that 
were especially good at working interdependently on a larger scale and could 
outperform rivaling groups in the competition for resources.   
Even if being and acting as a good cooperator was the survival strategy in the 
long run and supposedly formed us as a species, there are almost always 
temptations for individuals to not cooperate in a given situation (e.g., in a Prisoners 
Dilemma3). One might want to save energy or some other attractive reward might 
                                               
2 Comparing humans with our closest relatives (in particular chimpanzees) and, hence, the closest 
model we have to a common ancestor, we see striking differences. Great apes have evolved to live 
their lives in a rather competitive mode marked by rivalry for access to resources like food, mates 
and dominance and they don’t depend on food from collaborative hunting (Boesch, 1994). Hence, 
their cognitive and social skills are best adapted for succeeding when competing with others and 
they perform poorly when they are confronted with situations where cooperative instead of 
competitive behavior is the better strategy (Hare & Tomasello, 2004; Tomasello, Call, & Gluckman, 
1997; Call, Hare, and Tomasello, 1998). Interestingly, pet-dogs outperform our closest relatives in 
these kinds of tasks as they have evolved to live closely together and in a cooperative manner with 
humans during domestication (Hare & Tomasello, 1999). 
 
3 The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD, e.g., Axelrod & Dion, 1988) is a game theoretical example why 
individuals might not cooperate, even if it appears that it is in their best interests to do so. In a PD, 
each player chooses between “cooperation” or “defection”. Given the classical payoff structure of a 
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appear. However, most of us would not defect in the middle of a collaborative 
activity. Liebenberg’s hunter wouldn’t stop the persistence hunt on his part of the 
track (while his partner is still covering the other end) to pick a few berries on the 
way if that means that the game will escape. His defection could put both hunters 
at risk of ending up hungry. Most of us would feel bad or uncomfortable to abandon 
our collaborative partner while the collaboration is ongoing, and that is especially 
true if we have previously agreed to collaborate. Why so? Because of joint 
commitments and the feeling of obligation they entail.  
1.4 Joint Commitments 
“Let’s move the heavy stone out of the way, okay?” – “Yeah!” 
This it all it takes. Two people agree to do something together - a joint 
commitment is created. In this case it is an explicit verbal joint commitment. Of 
course, it would count just as much if the second person would just nod. Or, if both 
just nod at each other, for example if they don’t speak the same language but a 
necessary collaborative endeavor is saliently and unambiguously in front of them 
like a big stone blocking their way. There even seem to be other forms for a 
commitment to come into place: routines, highly coordinated and synchronous 
activities and, situations that comprise an interdependence between individuals 
seem to be able to create joint commitments (see Chapter 1.4.2). Herbert H. Clark 
(2006), introduced a classification of different types of commitments with regard 
to their addressee and even includes self-commitments – which are commitments 
that one owes to oneself. Within the scope of this dissertation we are going to look 
at the standard case – interpersonal or participatory commitments as Clark (2006) 
would call them. 
Fjslhtl lgjkrah godrah oga rdoitd oh iaor ihdrif tz oird iud zijdilfj ltjzi I toirdu 
ith 
                                               
PD game, each player prefers to defect while the other cooperates (free-riding, giving the highest 
individual payoff) and wants to avoid cooperating while the other defects (giving the lowest 
individual payoff). Rationally this leads both players to defect which then would result in a lower 
payoff than if both players were cooperating. 
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1.4.1 Margaret Gilbert – commitments in the strict sense 
Usually, individuals agree to do something together and thus create the 
commitment to the shared goal (e.g., moving the stone out of the way or taking a 
walk together). According to Gilbert (1990, 2009), such joint commitments are 
always coupled with (a) an obligation to follow through until the joint goal is 
reached and (b) the partner’s right to rebuke if he or she is abandoned in the 
pursuit of that joint goal. Thus, a joint commitment is a good way to keep all 
partaking actors on track to work towards a joint goal in spite of distractions and 
attractive alternative behaviors. Gilbert’s famous example is that of two people 
enjoying a walk together. Now, imagine that two strangers meet in the park, start 
talking and decide to take a walk together. The alternative is that both individuals 
never actually agreed to walk together but incidentally happen to walk the same 
path, in the same pace, at the same time, etc. For an outsider both scenarios seem 
identical, however only in the scene where the two strollers agreed to walk together 
their activity is based on a shared goal whereas in the other it is based on 
individual goals. Now, in the case of a commitment to a shared goal, Gilbert argues, 
neither of the two individuals can simply change their mind and walk in the other 
direction without giving some kind of explanation or excuse to the other (as 
postulated in (a) they have to follow through walking together for the agreed upon 
distance or time etc.) or else expect their walking partner to be bewildered or even 
offended and demanding adherence to the joint goal (as postulated in (b) the 
partner’s harnessing of his right to rebuke). Promises, also usually made in 
language, seem to be a special kind of a joint commitment with an additional 
assurance to be truly committed to fulfill one’s pledge and to some degree tying 
one’s honor (or one’s word of honor) to this assurance and also facilitate cooperation 
(Bicchieri, 2002). In our modern societies today, also a variety of legal measures 
(like contracts or laws) are used to ensure commitments to one another.  
1.4.2 John Michael – the sense of commitment 
However, as mentioned above people often feel and act committed although 
there was no promise or explicit commitment formed and they often do so despite 
attractive alternative options being available. As Michael and colleagues (2016a) 
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point out, the feeling of an obligation or commitment to a partner and the joint goal 
cannot only arises from explicit (verbal or written etc.) agreements and contracts 
but it can also emerge implicitly out of situational factors and cognitive processes 
(Michael, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2016a). If, for example, it has become a routine that 
I give my colleague a ride home after work on such a regular basis that he stops 
bringing money for the bus, most of us would feel obliged to let him know in 
advance if we can’t make it even though it was never explicitly established that we 
will carpool every day. In a recent study, Michael and colleagues (2016b) found 
that a higher level of coordination between two actors within a joint action 
enhances the perceived commitment of the agents. In their study, adult 
participants expected the actor to collaborate and resist an outside temptation 
longer in a high coordination situation that in a low coordination situation 
(Michael, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2016b). The authors suggest that a higher level of 
coordination creates social pressure to live up to the expectations of the partner 
and not waste the partner’s investment. Furthermore, the authors argue that the 
sense of an implicit commitment can be increased by (i) an increase in the duration 
of a habit or a joint action, (ii) an increased number of repetitions of a joint action, 
and (iii) an increase of effort and costs invested in the joint action of involved 
agents (see also Chennells, & Michael, 2018, Bonalumi, Isella, & Michael, 2018; 
and Székely, & Michael, 2018).  
Thus, forming joint commitments helps collaborators to set a clear frame for 
the interaction structuring roles of everybody that is involved, it creates a binding 
obligation to the joint goal and reduces uncertainty (motivational, instrumental 
and common ground uncertainty) about other’s behavior (Michael & Pacherie, 
2015). After a joint commitment everybody’s contribution is out in the open and 
living up to one’s word is important for everyone’s immediate outcome of the 
collaboration but also for the reputation of the agents involved and their self-
awareness. After forming a joint commitment, one can rely on the assumption that 
the partner will cooperate. 
 However, under certain circumstances individuals may not deliver their part 
of the collaborative activity for legitimate reasons which might release them from 
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their obligations. Imagine that the defection from the joint goal happens in the 
relevant time window (e.g., during collaborative hunting) without warning and 
ruining the promising opportunity for everyone involved. Here, resources that 
were already invested from other collaborators are put to waste. Usually only an 
accident or a very urgent matter would count as an excuse in such cases. Indeed, 
a recent vignette study investigating the Turkana, an acephalous nomadic pastoral 
society in East Africa, is in line with this assumption (Mathew & Boyd, 2014). The 
Turkana occasionally organize raids against neighboring ethnic groups to steal 
their cattle – a highly collaborative and interdependent endeavor. Results showed 
that the Turkana are motivated to sanction and exclude fictitious warriors that 
defected from collaborating in the cattle-raid because they were cowards. If a 
warrior partner had to back out because he was unskilled or because he was ill, 
the Turkana’s assessment was much less harsh. As a matter of fact, most of us 
would agree that given a legitimate reason a joint commitment can be resolved or 
suspended. I am not going to hold it against you, that you are not showing up to 
help me move my fridge when you have a fever, or your baby has a fever. However, 
it is quite likely that I will hold you up to our agreement when you try to excuse 
yourself by telling me that you want to watch a movie instead. Being truly 
unskilled does count as legitimate excuse too – how could I hold you accountable 
for the fact that you are simply too weak to be able to lift my extraordinarily big 
and heavy fridge? Of course, the preferable way is to mutually terminate the 
agreement or give collaborative partners a sufficient prior warning allowing them 
to recruit a replacement. Importantly, one cannot dissolve a joint commitment 
unilaterally. Just as when forming a joint commitment, everybody involved has to 
acknowledge that the agreement is no longer effective. 
To summarize, joint commitments can serve as a powerful tool in creating the 
feeling of an obligation towards a joint goal and a collaborative partner. There are 
different ways in which a joint commitment can come into place between 
collaborators. And, just as they can be agreed upon, joint commitments can be 
dissolved by agreement. Importantly, joint commitments seem to help integrating 
all of the specific stipulations for mutualistic cooperation that were discussed in 
the previous chapter on the philosophical reflections on cooperation (Bratman’s 
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(1992) three features of a shared activity, (i) Mutual responsiveness, (ii) 
Commitment to the joint activity and, (iii) Commitment to mutual support; 
Tuomela’s (2007) cooperation in the We-mode instead of cooperation in the I-mode, 
Searle’s (1995) considerations about the underlying intention; and Darwall’s 
(2006) second-personal standpoint where free and rational beings treat each other 
with mutual respect and as equally deserving and accountable).  
In order to fully understand a phenomenon like cooperative behavior and the 
complexity of joint commitments one cannot disregard its ontogeny. Human 
children are not born as rational moral agents. In fact, it’s a long way from the 
egocentricity of the infant (Piaget, 1932) that might come equipped with a 
preference for the good (Hamlin, 2013; Buyukozer Dawkins, Ting, Stavans, & 
Baillargeon, in press) to the impartial, rational, fair and moral agents that 
Bratman (1992), Tuomela (2007), Searle (1990) and Darwall (2006) picture in their 
analyses.  
1.5 Children’s developing understanding of and competences to collaborate and 
engage in joint commitments: Empirical Findings  
Following the theoretical and philosophical considerations, a probable 
evolutionary background of human cooperation and the important role of joint 
commitments from the previous chapters, I will now briefly review empirical work 
that focuses on the development of cooperation and the understanding of joint 
commitments in children. The competences of a fully functioning member of the 
uniquely human cooperation is not present from birth but is acquired over years 
of learning and experiences. The same is of course true for children’s 
understanding of joint commitments.  
Cooperative activities 
Starting in their first months of life, children seem to be intrinsically motivated 
and interested to interact with others (Tomasello, 2009a). By 9 to 12 months of 
age, infants show first triadic interactions combining both interactions with agents 
and objects in a jointly intentional manner and, thus, first evidence for shared 
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intentionality (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005). Starting at 14-
months of age, infants help an adult to reach an instrumental goal (e.g., they are 
picking up a clothespin that is out of reach for the adult; Warneken, Hare, Melis, 
Hanus, & Tomasello, 2007; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007). By 21 months, 
infants competently factor in their partners intention. In different collaborative 
tasks (with and without causal interdependence to reach the tasks goal) infants 
encouraged their partner to rejoin when she stopped collaborating. Importantly 
however, they distinguished whether she was unwilling to continue or unable to 
continue in that they encouraged their partner more when she was unable than 
when she seemed to have given up on the joint goal (Warneken, Gräfenhain, & 
Tomasello, 2012). Also, at 18 to 24 months, they try to reengage a defecting partner 
to reinstate a joint goal (Warneken, Chen, & Tomasello, 2006).  
While interactions with competent adult caregivers are often seen as the 
default, young children also engage with other children, be it with siblings, 
neighbors or in kindergarten. Peer interactions are interactions among equals and, 
thus, provide a very interesting test case for young children’s collaborative 
abilities. Brownell and colleagues administered a cooperative task to 19-, 23- and 
27-month-old peers. In order to make a puppet dance, they each had to 
simultaneously or sequentially pull a handle on a large box (Brownell, Ramani, & 
Zerwas, 2006). In their study, 19-month-olds failed to cooperate successfully with 
a peer partner and seemed to act rather coincidental than in a coordinated and 
cooperative manner. By 27 months of age, children were much better at monitoring 
and coordinating with their partner (and 23-month-olds falling in-between the two 
age groups). Brownell and colleagues point out that collaborative interactions with 
peers are much more demanding and challenging for children as they lack 
scaffolding and predictability and the well-structured and focused composition 
that interactions with adults usually comprise (see also Kachel, Moore & 
Tomasello, 2018 for compatible results where children in an object choice task 
distinguish between information provided to them by either peers or adults). Thus, 
first, children start to collaborate successfully with an adult partner and a little 
later, after their second birthday, they also interact more effectively with peers. 
For instance, by 2 years of age they begin to participate in collaborative activities 
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with others more effectively and successfully (Brownell & Carriger, 1990; Brownell 
& Carriger, 1991; Brownell et al., 2006) and as they grow older they succeed in 
more and more complex cooperative tasks, for example involving complementary 
roles for the two collaborative partners (Ashley & Tomasello, 1998; Fletcher, 
Warneken, & Tomasello, 2012; Warneken, Steinwender, Hamann, & Tomasello, 
2014).  
Joint commitments 
If children are already quite competent cooperators by the age of 3, what role 
do joint commitments in such early cooperation play? Unfortunately, there are only 
few studies examining this phenomenon in children.  For instance, following a 
successful collaboration, 3-year-old children in comparison to 2-year-olds or 
chimpanzees share the spoils of their cooperative work more often (Hamann, 
Bender, & Tomasello, 2014; Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg, & Tomasello, 2011; 
Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012; Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011) and, 
they are even able to factor in which partner worked harder when (re-)distributing 
rewards4 (Hamann et al., 2014; Hamann et al., 2011; Kanngiesser & Warneken, 
2012; Warneken et al., 2011). This capacity is especially important to keep 
cooperation stable over a longer period of time and can be considered a first hint of 
their understanding of joint commitments and mutual obligations. Thus, in their 
study Hamann and colleagues (2011) presented 2- and 3-year-old-children with a 
collaborative task that involved pulling on a rope together to receive marbles as a 
reward. As mentioned before, 3-year-old peers, but not 2-year-olds, shared marbles 
that were distributed unequally among the two players with each other more if 
                                               
4 At this point I want to include a word of warning concerning the generalizability of the presented 
findings with regard to the population samples of most of the literature presented in this 
dissertation and, in fact, for the participant samples of the empirical studies included in it, too. 
There is a growing body of literature supporting the claim that ‘WEIRD’ samples (participant 
samples drawn from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies), are among 
the worst populations one could find to generalize representatively about the human species 
(Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). Despite the assumption that cooperativeness and fairness 
may be the result of evolutionary adaptions and rather universal across human societies and that 
cultural differences and socially acquired norms should influence behavior least the younger the 
age group that is investigated is, there are also examples for cultural differences in early childhood 
(e.g., Callaghan et al., 2011; House et al., 2013; Schäfer, Haun, & Tomasello, 2015). 
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they were collaborating than when they were playing in parallel or in a windfall 
situation requiring no work (one child received one marble and the other received 
three marbles - experimentally induced via a rigged apparatus). Hence, after being 
interdependent in generating rewards, the lucky children that received more than 
the equal split of the spoils felt compelled to bring about the just outcome. In a 
different study, Hamann and colleagues further investigated children’s 
commitment to a collaborative partner in situations in which there was no explicit 
agreement between them. Using a staircase-like apparatus containing a long rod 
with a bowl containing a reward at each end, Hamann and colleagues manipulated 
whether children could access rewards on the same step of the stairs or whether 
rewards were accessible on different steps of the stairs-apparatus for each player 
(Hamann, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2012). Furthermore, they manipulated 
whether a previous collaboration was necessary or not. Results show that 3.5-year-
olds (but not 2.5-year-olds) continue to collaborate with a peer even after they 
themselves already received their reward on the lower step and continued to move 
the rod upstairs so that their partner could also access her bowl. Interestingly, in 
the condition where children collaborated first, most participants didn’t even stop 
collaboration to cash in their reward but provided immediate support for their 
partner. Thus, after collaboration (without an explicitly agreed upon joint 
commitment but with a common ground understanding about their 
interdependence) children that got their reward first wanted their partner to 
benefit from the collaboration just as they did. A study with 4-year-old children 
showed that merely leading preschoolers to belief that they are working together 
instead of separately or in a turn taking manner on a task, can increase persistence 
and liking of a challenging puzzle task (Butler & Walton, 2013). The commitment 
in these studies presented above did not result from an explicit agreement but 
rather out of the interdependent collaborative context in which these games were 
set up. Another very recent study adds that, starting at age 5, children can even 
interpret a communicative eye contact as a signal of a commitment to cooperation 
(Siposova, Tomasello, & Carpenter, 2018; see also Wyman, Rakoczy, and 
Tomasello, 2013). 
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There are also a few studies that investigate children’s behavior after they have 
formed an explicit joint commitment to a partner (orchestrated by the adult 
experimenter). For instance, Gräfenhain and colleagues (2009, Study 1) found that 
3-year-olds in contrast to 2-year-olds waited for an adult partner longer and tried 
to re-engage her more after they had agreed to play together than when the adult 
joined the activity without a joint commitment (Gräfenhain, Behne, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2009). Furthermore, they found that 3- and 4-year-old children showed 
more signs of leave taking when enticed away from their activity with an adult 
partner after they had made a joint commitment to act together compared to when 
they had not (2009, Study 2). Children acknowledged their leaving before or while 
leaving to play a different game (by e.g., verbally indicating that they want to play 
the other game, handing the object they had been playing with to the experimenter 
or looking to the adult). However, Gräfenhain and colleagues do not report any 
attempts to obtain an approval from the abandoned experimenter. The authors 
discuss that the rather direct and tempting invitation from the second 
experimenter to come and play the other game (even calling children by their name 
and holding out a tool for them) could cause a conflict in children about where their 
obligations lie. Hence, children by 3 years of age seem to understand that a partner 
who declared to be committed is more obliged to a joint activity than a partner who 
just started playing the same game in parallel with them. Additionally, they also 
seem to feel more obliged themselves - not obliged enough to reject a better option 
when it becomes available, but enough to pause and take leave and acknowledge 
their withdrawal if they previously had made a joint commitment. Similarly, in 
interaction with a puppet partner, children at 3 years of age waited for their 
partner more, and were more likely to help her after they made a joint commitment 
to work on a puzzle together than when they played with their own puzzle 
(Gräfenhain, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2013).  
Promises  
Research investigating children’s competences with regard to promises are also 
of interest when looking at their understanding of joint commitments because, as 
mentioned before, promises can be considered a special kind of a joint commitment. 
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A recent study suggests that, also, starting at age 3 children begin to understand 
promises and their normative obligations (Kanngiesser, Koymen, & Tomasello, 
2017). They found a qualitative difference in children’s protest behavior in a 
broken promise condition versus a control condition already to some extent in 3-
year-old children and more pronounced in 5-year-olds. Furthermore, children that 
had made a promise persisted longer in a boring cleaning task after they had 
promised to do so compared to when they didn’t agree to the arrangement (Study 
2). Again, the difference between conditions was clearly more pronounced in the 5-
year-olds, but also by 3 years of age children showed signs in this direction. 
However, another recent study by Lyon and colleagues found that children at age 
3 struggle with the statement “I promise” (Lyon & Evans, 2014). In their study, 3-
year-olds preferred a character who said “I will” to a character who said “I promise” 
and only children at 6 years of age distinguished that “I promise” is a stronger 
guarantee of performance than “I will” (see also Astington, 1988; Mant & Perner, 
1988 for more findings hinting at a delay until about 9 years of age in children’s 
understanding of commitments and promises). A different study found a promise 
effect starting at age 5 in Han Chinese children (Heyman, Fu, Lin, Qian, & Lee, 
2015). Children’s rates of cheating in a card game were substantially lower in a 
condition where they promised not to peak (cheat) than in a no-promise condition. 
The cheating rates did not differ between the two conditions for 4-year-olds (the 
youngest age group they tested). Another recent study found that by 5 to 6 years 
of age children selectively trust partners who have kept a promise (study 1), prefer 
partners who kept a promise to help over a partner that broke this promise (study 
2) and, in a third study, 5-year-olds preferred partners who kept a promise to help 
over partner that helped without promising (Isella, Kanngiesser, & Tomasello, 
2018). In the third study, however, 5-year-olds did not distinguish between a 
puppet who broke the promise to help and a neutral puppet that failed to help (but 
didn’t promise to help).  
Taken together the research presented above suggests that at age 3, children 
begin to understand not only commitments in joint actions but also start to grasp 
a special type of commitments namely explicit promises - even though results also 
show that it seems to be only at an age of 5 that they comprehend promises more 
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broadly. Developmentally, this is also the time when children begin to show a 
growing understanding in other socio-cognitive competencies, like social norms, 
fairness, taking others intentions into consideration when judging them morally 
and caring about their reputation. These are certainly associated with and 
relevant for being able to engage in cooperative activities framed by joint 
commitments. For instance, children in their third year of life become increasingly 
skillful at understanding their partners’ intentions (Josephs, Kushnir, 
Gräfenhain, & Rakoczy, 2015; Nunez & Harris, 1998; Vaish, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2010). Also, by 3 years of age children can learn arbitrary norms and 
enforce these norms if necessary (Rakoczy & Schmidt, 2013; Schmidt, Rakoczy, & 
Tomasello, 2012, 2013; Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012). Furthermore, a growing body 
of literature investigated children’s protest, punishment or tattling as reactions to 
norm transgressions (moral and conventional) showing instances of normative 
protest and enforcing norms at 3 years of age (Ingram & Bering, 2010; Rakoczy, 
Wameken, & Tomasello, 2008; Tuncgenc, Hohenberger, & Rakoczy, 2015). Vaish 
and colleagues (2011) report that 3-year-old children actively intervene in a third-
party moral transgression although the harmed agent is not even present (Vaish, 
Missana, & Tomasello, 2011). Melis and colleagues (2013) argue that sharing fewer 
resources than an equal split, is a punishment for the free-riding puppet partner 
(Melis, Altrichter, & Tomasello, 2013). Likewise, an extensive amount of work 
looked at children’s understanding of fairness and their sharing behavior. Recent 
research suggests that infants as young as 15 to 19-months expect resources to be 
divided equally and prefer agents who administer equal allocations (Geraci & 
Surian, 2011; Sloane, Baillargeon, & Premack, 2012; Sommerville, Schmidt, Yun, 
& Burns, 2013). Despite children’s preference for fairness, numerous studies show 
a gap between children’s understanding of fairness and their actual behavior in 
resource allocation tasks (e.g., Blake et al., 2015; Blake, McAuliffe, & Warneken, 
2014; Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; Moore, 2009; Rochat et al., 2009; C. E. 
Smith, Blake, & Harris, 2013). For instance, Smith et al. (2013) found that 3 to 6 
year-old-children predicted that they would favor themselves even though they 
stated that the right thing to do would be to share half. Only 7- to 8-year-olds 
actually shared equally. But instead of a limited inhibitory control or a selfish 
desire to simply maximize their own rewards, children seem to strive for a relative 
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advantage in windfall gain settings (Blake & McAuliffe, 2011; Blake et al., 2014; 
House, Henrich, Sarnecka, & Silk, 2013; Sheskin, Bloom, & Wynn, 2014). At 
approximately 5 years of age, children start to be concerned about their reputation 
(Engelmann, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2016; Engelmann & Rapp, 2018). For 
instance, they share more and steal less when a peer is watching them, they 
behave more generous when being watched by a group member or a future partner 
and they show an increase in prosocial behavior in a public compared to a private 
setting (Engelmann, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2012; Engelmann, Herrmann, & 
Tomasello, 2018; Engelmann, Over, Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2013; Rapp, 
Engelmann, Herrmann, & Tomasello, in prep). To summarize, the research 
presented above suggests that between 3 and 5 years of age children develop 
significantly with regard to their competencies in cooperative behaviors, engaging 
in and appreciating joint commitments and promises as well as other relevant 
cognitive and social behaviors. Taken together, the studies presented above make 
this age-group a promising candidate for a further investigation of children’s 
understanding of joint commitment.  
1.6 Focus of the Dissertation  
The previous chapters have aimed at giving a theoretical and ontogenetic 
overview on uniquely human cooperation and the special role of joint 
commitments. For a better understanding of how joint commitments can help to 
guide and structure cooperation, this dissertation focusses on what young children 
know about joint commitments and the obligations that go along with them. 
Previous research has shown that it is around 3 years of age that children not only 
possess the abilities to act as competent cooperators but also begin to show an 
understanding of joint commitments. However, there are numerous aspects about 
children’s abilities with regard to joint commitments that haven’t been 
investigated at all or only in a rather unsystematic way. For instance, most 
previous studies focused on the distribution of or sharing of the spoils of 
collaborative activities. No study has looked at whether children consider it a 
normative obligation to fulfil one’s role in a committed collaboration and whether 
there might be circumstances that can release one from such an obligation. 
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Furthermore, in most previous studies there was no explicit joint commitment 
between collaborators. Rather, it arose through previous collaboration. Finally, in 
studies entailing an explicit commitment or promise, children often interacted 
with adults. This could be a potential problem since adults usually are perceived 
as an authority which is very likely to influence children’s behavior. Already Piaget 
(1932) argued, that: 
“[…] the moral evolution of the child […] can develop only through 
the progress made by cooperation and mutual respect – cooperation between 
children to begin with, and then between child and adult as the child 
approaches adolescence […].”  
       (Piaget, 1932, p. 378) 
The focus of the present dissertation will be on preschoolers’ understanding of 
joint commitments after they have formed an explicit joint commitment and, while 
being in a collaborative interaction with a peer partner, not an adult.5 Additionally, 
it is conceivable that developmentally it could make a difference for children’s 
adherence to a commitment (for example in their ability to resist attractive 
alternative options) depending on whether they owe it to a partner or whether it 
is owed to them.  Lastly, it is not clear, what children know about the dissolvability 
of joint commitments and whether they absolve their collaborative partner from 
his or her obligations after a legitimate termination of such agreements. The three 
studies presented in my dissertation attempt to provide answers to these 
questions.  
The first study, explored children’s reactions to a partner’s failure to perform 
their role in a joint commitment. If children associate a normative obligation to 
fulfil one’s role after one has committed to it, they should react not just with 
personal disappointment, but with norm-based indignation and protest to a 
                                               
5 In all of the studies, one child served as the subject, whereas the other child was a stooge, a naïve 
confederate prompted by the experimental context to behave in ways necessary for the realization 
of the manipulation. In the third study, where the stooge role was too demanding for age mates to 
serve as stooges, I opted to use a puppet partner who was introduced as an age mate and served as 
a proxy for a peer partner. 
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partner’s defection in a collaborative task. Thus, study 1 explored children’s 
reactions in situations where a collaborative partner disengages from a joint task 
for various reasons. I presented 3-year-olds with a collaborative task where a 
confederate peer partner disengages from the joint activity. I manipulated the 
reasons why the peer partner stopped cooperating in three conditions. In the 
Selfish condition it appeared to the subject child as if the partner selfishly 
abandoned the joint task to which he had previously committed himself. In two 
control conditions, the partner quit the joint task either because he did not know 
how to play (Ignorant condition) or because the apparatus broke (Accidental 
condition). Importantly, the measure was second-personal protest towards a naïve 
confederate peer partner.  To my knowledge, this is the youngest age group ever 
used in a confederate role. Parallel to the protest measure, subject children were 
expected to be most emotionally aroused when confronted with a selfishly 
perceived defection and least in the Accidental condition where the stooge 
obviously didn’t mean to break the apparatus. Since the peer partner appeared 
willing to pursue the joint goal but acted unqualified in the Ignorant condition, 
helping and teaching the stooge partners to overcome their incompetence seemed 
like a promising strategy for my participants.  
The second study addressed the question whether children adhere to different 
types of joint commitments as much as to reject alternative individual rewards 
when they owe it to their partner to follow through, not when it is owed to them. 
Specifically, I asked whether children value different types of joint commitments 
as much as to reject alternative individual rewards (bribes). Furthermore, I was 
interested how forming an explicit joint commitment on top of a commonly known 
interdependence influences children’s feeling of obligation towards their partner. 
Therefore, I presented pairs of 3- and 5-year-old children with an apparatus that, 
if operated jointly, would provide an equal amount of rewards for both of them. At 
test, I gave the subject child of each dyad the possibility to operate the apparatus 
differently to receive a higher amount of rewards for themselves, leaving their 
partner with nothing. I manipulated the depth of children’s commitment to play 
jointly. In one condition (the Explicit commitment condition) both children knew 
from the previous training that playing alone would not work, only playing jointly 
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would result in equal rewards for both players. Furthermore, children in that 
condition formed an explicit commitment to play together, both verbally and 
behaviorally (by making a high five to emphasize the partnership). For 
comparison, another condition was identical but lacked the explicit commitment 
(the Implicit commitment condition). In a third condition (the Parallel-play 
condition), children learned that each of them could operate one part of the 
apparatus independently of the partner. However, during the training phase they 
always played together in parallel, resulting in the same amount of rewards for 
each player as in the other two conditions. At test I measured whether my subject 
children could restrain themselves from abandoning their partner for individual 
rewards depending on the strength of commitment between them and their 
partner.  
In my third study I investigated children’s understanding of the dissolvability 
of joint commitments while playing a collaborative game with a puppet partner. 
The study investigated children’s reactions to the termination of the collaboration 
by the puppet partner. I manipulated the puppet partner’s behavior when 
abandoning the subject child. In my experimental condition, the puppet partner 
gave a brief and neutral reason (she had forgotten something) and then asked for 
the child’s okay to leave. In a second condition the puppet only stated the brief 
reason and then left. In a third condition, the puppet broke up the commitment 
without any attempts of dissolving the previously formed commitment by leaving 
the game without saying anything to the child. As previous research has shown, 
by age 3 children start to understand that obligations to follow through go along 
with joint commitments. Thus, in this study I questioned whether children this 
young also acknowledge that commitments can be dissolved and whether they 
distinguish a mutually dissolved termination from a rather unilaterally dissolved 
agreement or a defection without any approval. 
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Abstract 
When children make a joint commitment to collaborate, obligations are created. 
Pairs of three-year-old children (N = 144) made a joint commitment to play a game. 
In three different conditions the game was interrupted in the middle either 
because (i) the partner child intentionally defected; (ii) the partner child was 
ignorant about how to play; or (iii) the apparatus broke. The subject child reacted 
differently in the three cases, protesting normatively against defection (with 
emotional arousal and later tattling), teaching when the partner seemed to be 
ignorant, or simply blaming the apparatus when it broke. These results suggest 
that three-year-old children are competent in making appropriate normative 
evaluations of intentions and obligations of collaborative partners. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Humans collaborate by forming a joint goal, which then structures their 
individual roles. To sustain their cooperation over time, partners must then share 
the spoils of their collaborative effort in some mutually satisfactory way. Much 
research has documented that collaborating in this way – with joint goals that 
structure individual roles in pursuit of shared rewards – is a uniquely human form 
of social interaction (see Tomasello, 2014, for a review). Young children begin 
collaborating in this species-unique manner from around 18 months of age when 
they are interacting with an adult (Warneken et al., 2006), and from around 24 
months of age when they are interacting with a peer (Brownell & Carriger, 1991). 
It is also during this same age range that toddler peers begin to share the spoils of 
their collaborative effort in mutually satisfactory (often equal) ways (Ulber, 
Hamann, & Tomasello, 2015). 
 Another special characteristic of human collaboration is its normative 
dimension, that is, acknowledgement that there are “right”, culturally accepted 
ways of collaborating, that one is expected to honor if one enters a collaborative 
interaction. Quite often humans initiate a collaborative activity by agreeing to do 
so; for example, one individual says "Let's X" and the other says "Okay" (or just 
begins collaborating). Gilbert (1990) points out that this seemingly minor 
communicative act serves to create between collaborators a mutual obligation (see 
also Michael, et al., 2016a). That is, by making a joint commitment, the partners 
recognize together in their common ground that each expects the other to make 
sincere efforts to play her role successfully. If they have experience together in a 
particular collaborative activity, the common ground expectations about how each 
of them should fulfill her role may be quite specific: for their joint success one 
partner must do X and the other must do Y. They may also have common ground 
expectations about dividing the spoils in mutually satisfactory ways. The joint 
commitment is normative in the sense that it refers to shared standards and the 
failure of one partner to honor it entitles the other to protest. If the offender wishes 
to stay in good standing with the offended partner, he or she must accept such 
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protest (assuming that it is legitimate) by acknowledging that his or her behavior 
must be changed and brought back to the shared standard. Protest is legitimate 
when it is based on the partners' common ground understanding of what 
constitutes adequate role performance or a mutually satisfactory outcome.  
Young children begin to structure at least some of their collaborative activities 
with joint commitments from around three years of age (Tomasello & Hamann, 
2012). For example, when two 3-year-olds commit to a joint activity and one of 
them unexpectedly receives his or her reward first or receives a larger reward, that 
lucky child nevertheless persists until the unlucky child receives his or her reward 
as well or else shares some of the own excess bounty with the unlucky child 
(Hamann et al., 2011; Hamann et al., 2012). In contrast, if the two children enter 
the room and go right to the rewards, without collaboration, the lucky child just 
consumes her reward without a thought of the unlucky child. This shows that it is 
indeed the joint commitment to collaborate that creates the obligation to behave 
in cooperative ways. The normative force of the joint commitment is especially 
clear when one of the partners takes more than her fair share of the spoils of a 
collaborative effort, in which case the unlucky child typically protests and the 
lucky child almost always relents (Warneken et al., 2011). If a three-year-old child 
wants to break her joint commitment, they know that they must, in some sense, 
either ask permission or apologize for defection (Gräfenhain et al., 2009). 
All of these previous studies have focused on young children’s joint 
commitments to joint goals or else their sharing of the spoils at the end. None has 
focused directly on children's understanding of the specific roles that each of them 
must play for joint success in an interdependent task, including the normative 
standards that govern each individual’s role and so legitimate partner protest 
when the commitment is broken. Normally, the common ground understanding of 
role standards arises after partners have collaborated together in a given activity 
(see Fletcher et al., 2012 for evidence that after just a few iterations of a 
collaborative activity three-year-olds learn both their own role and also that of the 
partner). At that point, if one partner does not play her role in accordance with the 
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mutually known role standard, the other partner can legitimately protest, because 
it is clear that the defecting partner knows what he or she is supposed to do and 
so is breaking the commitment knowingly and intentionally. This situation is of 
primary interest to the current study and serves as a model for our experimental 
condition.  
On the other hand, if there has not been previous collaboration between 
partners, then each may wonder if the other actually knows her role standard, in 
which case poor performance might be reacted to not with protest but with 
teaching.  Additionally, if a role violation was unavoidable - for example, due to 
circumstances outside of anyone’s control - then partners do not have legitimate 
grounds for blaming the partner who stops collaborating. These two situations 
serve as models for two control conditions in the current study, together addressing 
children’s abilities to discern various interpersonal nuances of a joint task. To react 
appropriately to what looks like a defection on the part of one partner, the other 
needs to (a) understand the normative structure of a collaboration governed by 
joint commitment, and (b) be able to infer and evaluate the specific intentions 
behind the defecting partner’s behavior.  
No prior research has examined the development of these particular abilities 
in young children in the context of joint commitment. However, the development 
of related abilities, such as understanding intentions behind other norm violations, 
has been investigated.  Recent studies show that over the third and fourth years 
of life, children become increasingly skillful at understanding people’s intentions 
behind seemingly negative behaviors and at distinguishing between intentional 
versus accidental transgressions. For example, English and Columbian 
preschoolers can discriminate between norm violations caused intentionally versus 
those caused by physical constraints (Nunez & Harris, 1998). Similarly, 3-year-
olds were less likely to help adults who had harmed someone intentionally (and 
even those who had intended but failed to harm) than those who had harmed 
someone accidentally (Vaish et al., 2010).  In another recent study, 3- and 4-year-
olds protested less when a puppet partner made a mistake under constrained 
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conditions than when it occurred under free conditions (Josephs et al., 2015).  
Interestingly, the effect of the puppet’s free choice was more pronounced when the 
mistake was framed as moral than when it was framed as conventional. A growing 
body of literature has also investigated children’s protest, punishment or tattling 
as reactions to norm transgressions, and has documented instances of normative 
protest and enforcing conventional and moral norms at 3 years of age (Ingram & 
Bering, 2010; Rakoczy et al., 2008; Tuncgenc et al., 2015; Vaish et al., 2011). 
In the current study, our goal was to explore this normative dimension of young 
peers’ collaborative activities structured by joint commitments. That is to say, we 
wanted to explore young children's understanding of the normative standards 
governing different roles in a collaborative activity, as well as their understanding 
of which forms of failure to collaborate justify partner protest. We thus exposed 
pairs of three-year-old peers to an apparatus that required each of them to pull in 
a particular way to obtain mutual rewards. Before letting the children work 
together, we trained one of the children (the “partner child”) to play in such a way 
that her performance appeared substandard to the other child (the “subject child”, 
whose reactions we measured). We manipulated the reason for which - as it 
appeared to the subject child - the partner child stopped collaborating in the test 
phase.  
In one condition (the Selfish condition) children had a common ground 
understanding of how each of the two roles had to be played for joint success; the 
partner child then switched to a different game, abandoning the subject.  In this 
condition, we expected that substandard performance by one partner would elicit 
protest from the other. In another condition (the Ignorant condition) the children 
were uncertain about how well the partner knew the activity. In this condition, we 
expected that substandard performance might, at least on some occasions, elicit 
attempts at teaching the ignorant partner how to play her role. In a third condition 
(the Accidental condition), children had a common ground understanding of the 
task, but then one child was unable to perform her role due to a mechanical failure 
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of the apparatus. In this condition, we expected lower occurrences of protest or 
teaching.   
In either condition, when protest or teaching occurred, we additionally 
categorized it into descriptive, personal, and normative types.  We expected a 
higher occurrence of normative protest (“You shouldn’t do that!”) in the Selfish 
than the other conditions, because the partner’s behavior in that condition looked 
to the subject child like an intentional defection from a mutually agreed-upon 
obligation, i.e. a violation of the norm of joint commitment.  We expected some 
normative language in the Ignorant condition as well, but in the context of teaching 
(“This is how we should play”) rather than protest, because the appropriate 
reaction in that condition was to explain the rules of the game to the ignorant 
partner.  We additionally coded subject children’s emotional arousal and their 
responses to the experimenter’s questions about how the game went (tattling), and 
we predicted that in Selfish condition children would show higher arousal, 
signaling indignation, and higher instances of tattling and blaming the partner.  
We tested 3.5-year-old children, because extensive prior research suggests that 
by that age children not only possess the competences to act jointly and form joint 
commitments, but they also become increasingly skillful at understanding others’ 
intentions, protesting against transgressors and enforcing norms (Gräfenhain et 
al., 2009; Brownell & Carriger, 1991; Hamann et al., 2011, Nunez & Harris, 1998; 
Rakoczy et al., 2008; Josephs et al., 2015). During the pilot phase of the study we 
attempted the procedure with a younger age group (2.5- to 3-year-olds) but they 
were not able to follow the procedure.  The criteria for the “partner” role in the 
dyads were especially difficult to implement with children younger than 3.5 years 
of age.  
Importantly, in this study we measured protest between peers. Previous norm-
violation studies mainly investigated children’s protest in interaction with adults 
or puppets played by adults (Rakoczy, Hamann, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2010; 
Rakoczy et al., 2008; Vaish et al., 2011). However, it is unclear to which extent 
children’s respect for authority might influence their performance in such tasks. 
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The peer paradigm allows a clearer insight into children’s understanding of joint 
commitment as they are tested in interaction with equals. 
2.2 Method 
2.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 144 3.5-year-old children (M = 41.6 months, SD =1.3; 72 
boys;) of heterogeneous socioeconomic backgrounds (predominantly middle-class 
and Caucasian), attending preschool in a medium-sized European city. Prior to the 
study, parents had given informed consent for their children’s participation. 
Children were tested in same-sex dyads. In each dyad only one child was an actual 
subject; the second child (hereafter the partner) was trained as a confederate but 
remained naïve to that. This resulted in N = 72 subject children (36 boys) and N = 
72 partner children (36 boys). Six additional dyads were tested but excluded from 
analyses due to experimenter (N = 2) or confederate (N = 4) error. A confederate 
error was when the partner child deviated from his or her instructions in both test 
trials; for example, started pulling on the rope in the condition where he or she 
was supposed to open a box instead. If the partner’s behavior deviated during only 
one of the two test trials, the other test trial was included in the analyses (this was 
the case in ten dyads). Dyads were trained and tested in a quiet room in their 
preschool in a session lasting approximately 60 minutes. Data collection took place 
between November 2014 and May 2015.   
2.2.2 Materials and Design 
A modified version of the apparatus used by Hamann and colleagues (2011; 
2014) was used (see Figure 1). In order to obtain two marbles (one for each player), 
both partners had to pull on a rope together to move a block towards the two 
marbles. Pulling on the rope alone as well as accessing both ends of the rope was 
impossible, which created the necessity for collaboration. When two partners 
pulled together, the block moved and pushed the marbles from their platform and 
they rolled towards two separate openings where the players could retrieve them. 
The children could then insert their marbles into an opening in an elephant-shaped 
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“jingle machine” behind the apparatus as a reward. The game was presented to 
them as “feeding the elephant”. 
Our modification of the task was that as children confronted the task, both 
ropes were not immediately accessible but had to be retrieved from the backside of 
the apparatus by moving a detachable handle (with the rope magnetically attached 
to it) along a zigzag-shaped track. Only if both children moved their handles with 
the rope to the front, could the joint pulling begin. In all three conditions the 
subject children learned that this was the way to play the game. Partner children, 
trained separately, learned the basics of this task but with variations in the 
different conditions. 
Participants for each dyad were randomly selected among children who were 
available (and whose parents had given informed consent) at the preschool on the 
day of testing. Then dyads were randomly assigned to the three experimental 
conditions (Selfish; Ignorant; Accidental); within each dyad, children were 
randomly assigned to their role in the dyad (subject; partner). Each dyad received 
two test trials in one of three conditions in a between-subjects design. 
 
Figure 1. Apparatus of the main game. The ropes can be attached to the handles. 
The handles have to be moved along the zigzag-shaped tracks on the sides. The 
subject (here on the right side) takes out the rope in the front to pull. The partner 
child (on the left side) takes out the handle in the middle of the zigzag-shaped track 
through an additional hole. 
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2.2.3 Procedure 
Dyads of children were picked up in their classroom and brought to the test 
room by the lead experimenter (E1). After a brief familiarization, each child 
individually received three training trials with E1 while the other child was 
outside with an assistant experimenter (E2). The subject child in all three 
conditions learned how to play the collaborative version of game: at each trial, the 
subject and E1 sat by their respective sides of the apparatus; they each moved their 
handle along the zigzag track to retrieve the rope; then they pulled together, each 
on their end of the rope, to get the marbles and feed them to the elephant. The 
training ensured that the subject understood the interdependent aspect of the 
game, that is, that one partner could not pull and retrieve the rewards if the other 
did not participate. The partner child received a different individual training from 
E1 depending on the respective condition.   
Partner training for Selfish condition. In this condition, the partner child was 
trained to play the game differently, so that during the test phase his or her 
performance looked like defection from collaboration to the subject child (the 
partner was unaware of that).  The game presented by E1 to the partner involved 
detaching the handle (that could also be used for pulling) from the apparatus and 
using that handle to open an individual colorful box and retrieve stickers from it. 
The box (subsequently the “selfish box”) was placed on the partner’s side of the 
apparatus. It contained a red sticker and a sheet of paper with a drawing of an 
elephant. During training the partner child was told that the game was to retrieve 
the sticker and place it on the paper elephant’s belly. That way, the expression 
“feeding the elephant”, subsequently used by E1, made sense for both children, 
although it involved different actions for each of them. For the partner child, 
“feeding the elephant” involved detaching the handle of the apparatus midway 
along the zigzag-path (facilitated by an additional hole in the side panel) and using 
that handle to open the selfish box.  During test phase, from the subject child’s 
perspective, such actions on the part of the partner looked like abandoning the 
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joint pulling game in the middle, i.e. defecting, because the subject could not pull 
on the apparatus alone.  
Additionally, in this condition, subject children also received their own selfish 
box with a sticker (but without a paper elephant) and during training they 
experienced using the handle for getting the sticker. That ensured that during the 
test (a) the subject child understood what the partner was doing, and (b) the 
partner saw that the subject also had such a box and thought that they were 
playing the same game. The subject child experienced the box at the beginning of 
the training; then E1 proceeded with teaching him or her the joint pulling game. 
In all the following training trials and during the test trials the subject’s selfish 
box remained already open and was empty (see Figure 2 A).  
Partner training for Ignorant condition. In this condition, in order to make the 
partner appear incompetent but willing to collaborate, the partner child was 
trained to operate the apparatus in a way (involving pulling on the side) that 
worked during training but would not work later during the test. The subject child 
was trained in the correct way to use the ropes (pull from the front) but was also 
exposed on one training trial with E1 doing it the way that the partner would later 
do it (unsuccessfully pulling from the side). Thus, after the training trials, the 
partner child knew only how to pull (incorrectly) on the side and the subject child 
knew how to pull on the front and that pulling on the side would not work (see 
Figure 2 B).  
Partner training for Accidental condition. In this condition the partner child 
was supposed to be unsuccessful due to a reason outside of her control. During the 
individual training phase, each child was trained how to pull correctly together 
with E1 twice. On the third training trial, E1 experienced and commented on the 
“accidental breaking” of the handle of the apparatus on her side to familiarize both 
children with the situation. For that trial, the handle was rigged and broke in the 
middle of the zigzag path. The apparatus was then rigged in the same way on the 
partner’s side during test trials (see Figure 2 C). 
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Figure 2 A 
 
Figure 2 B 
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Figure 2 C 
Figure 2. The partner behavior in the three conditions. The partner is depicted on 
the left side and the subject on the right side. In all three conditions the partner 
starts by moving the handle along the zigzag-shaped track, until he or she reaches 
the hole in the middle of the track. In the Selfish condition (2A) the partner 
removes the handle through this hole to open the selfish box; in the Ignorant 
condition (2B) the partner removes the handle and rope through this hole to pull 
on the side; and in the Accidental condition (2C) the rigged handle breaks right 
next to the hole. 
 
Test trials.  After both children had received their training, the first test trial 
followed. E1 gathered the two children and announced that they now could play 
the game together, without E1. To create a joint commitment, E1 took both 
children by their hands and confirmed that they would play the game together 
now. Both the subject and the partner had to agree to that in the presence of each 
other by saying “yes”, “okay” or nodding. Then E1 accompanied the subject inside 
the test room and reminded him or her about the ultimate goal of the joint game 
(feeding marbles to the elephant). To ensure that the subject paid attention to the 
partner’s actions, E1 commented on the partner either in a confident way (“He 
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knows how to play the game”) in the Selfish and Accidental conditions, or in an 
uncertain way (“I’m not sure if he knows how the game really goes”) in the Ignorant 
condition. After that, E1 brought the partner into the room and left the children 
alone until the trial ended. After the first test trial, each child separately received 
an additional training trial with E1. This trial was added to remind them of their 
individual ways to play the game and to encourage them to proceed in the same 
way with the second test trial. Then the second test trial followed, identical to the 
first test trial.  
During each test trial, we measured subjects’ reactions to the partner’s failure 
(e.g., with protest, teaching, etc.) as well as their tattling behavior after each test 
trial. The subjects had 20 seconds to react from the time they noticed the failure 
(if they started to react at exactly 20 seconds, they were allowed to finish). If the 
subject did not react, the test trial was ended after 20 seconds, at which point E2 
entered the test room and called the partner to come out. Then E1 entered the test 
room, giving the subject the opportunity to tattle about what happened. If the 
subject did not spontaneously begin to tattle, E1 asked a series of three questions: 
1. “Did it work?”, 2. “Did you feed the elephant?”, 3. “Why did you not feed the 
elephant?”. How the game proceeded in each of the three conditions is depicted in 
Figure 2. At the end of the procedure, E1 fixed the apparatus for a final happy-end 
trial (not included in the analyses) in which children successfully collaborated and 
received their marbles. 
Our procedure script included a possibility of ending the testing early in case 
either of the children refused to continue, was distracted, or was upset. However, 
the latter never happened. All the children who started playing the game were 
willing to play in the second trial and in the happy-end trial.  
2.2.4 Coding and Reliability 
The main measure was the subject’s reactions to the partner’s behavior during 
the test phase when the two children were left alone to “play the game”. The 
subject’s language was transcribed and coded for protest and teaching utterances 
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of three different types: (1) normative language, (2) personal language (directing 
the partner without normative language) and (3) descriptive language (utterances 
without normative or personal language that contained descriptive relevance to 
the joint game). We used a modified version of the coding scheme from (Göckeritz, 
Schmidt, & Tomasello, 2014). Utterances were coded as protest if they indicated 
that the subject’s intention was to stop the partner’s current approach to playing 
the game, and as teaching if they indicated that the subject’s intention was to 
inform the partner about the right way to play the game (see Table 1 for 
descriptions and examples).  
Additionally, the subject’s emotional arousal during the test phase was 
measured on a scale between zero and three: (0) no behavioral change in the 
subject child, (1) subject child shows slight signs of irritation, (2) subject child 
shows signs of agitation, frustration, talks louder than previously, (3) subject child 
shows signs of extreme agitation, frustration or anger, screams at the partner. 
Following each test trial, spontaneous and elicited tattling behavior of the subjects 
was coded as one of the following three categories: (1) tattling that the goal was 
not reached but without blaming something or someone, (2) tattling with blaming 
the apparatus or (3) tattling with blaming the partner (see Table 1 for examples). 
All of the sessions were videotaped and coded by the first author. To establish 
reliability, a naïve coder who was blind to the conditions and the hypotheses of the 
study coded a randomly selected sample of 20% of the data for each measure in 
each condition. The two coders were in very good to excellent agreement (Cohen’s 
κ ranging between 0.71 and 1). 
 
Category Description Examples 
Protest Utterances that indicated that 
the subject’s intention was to stop 
the partner’s current approach to 
playing the game 
See below, for the 
different types of 
protest 
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Normative 
protest 
Utterances contain normative 
language: must not, have to, 
shouldn’t, wrong, false, etc. 
“that’s wrong”, “you’re 
not allowed to do that”, 
“no, you have to…”, 
Personal  
protest 
Utterances that are specifically 
directed at the stooge and his 
behavior without normative 
language, negative imperatives, 
basic protest, blameful 
interjections 
“don’t do that”, “stop it”, 
“no not like that”, “hey” 
Descriptive 
protest 
Descriptive utterances that don’t 
contain normative language or 
address the partner but have 
relevance to the game 
“it broke”, “you pull on 
the side”, “you took it 
out” 
Teaching Utterances that indicated that 
the subject’s intention was to 
inform the partner about the 
right way to play the game, 
utterances accompanied by 
demonstrations of the right way 
to play the game 
See below, for the 
different types of 
teaching 
Normative 
teaching 
Utterances contain normative 
language: must, have to, should, 
right, etc. 
“it goes like this”, “this 
is how you play it 
right”, “you have to get 
it to the front” 
Personal  
teaching 
Utterances that are specifically 
directed at the stooge and his 
behavior without normative 
language, positive imperatives 
“do this”, “pull”, “get 
your rope”, “like this”, 
“heave-ho” 
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Descriptive 
teaching 
Descriptive utterances in which 
the subject describes the action 
the partner should do without 
normative or imperative 
vocabulary. 
“further”, “up and 
down, up and down”, “to 
the front” 
Irrelevant Utterance that have no relevance 
to the game 
“blue is a nice color” 
Neutral 
Tattling 
Tattling utterances 
communicating that the game did 
not work but without blaming 
someone or something 
(descriptive) 
“we didn’t do it”, “you 
have to help me” 
Apparatus 
Tattling 
Tattling utterances 
communicating that the game did 
not work, blaming the apparatus 
“it/this broke”, “broken” 
Partner 
Tattling 
Tattling utterances 
communicating that the game did 
not work, blaming the partner 
child 
“she took the handle 
out”, “Maria broke it”, 
“Paul doesn’t know how 
to do it” 
 
Table 1. Examples of utterances for each type of protest, teaching, and tattling. 
 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Analysis 
We analyzed subjects’ protests and teaching separately, focusing on the effect 
of condition for each type of reaction. We also looked at children’s tattling and 
emotional arousal in the three conditions. For each analysis we ran a Generalized 
Linear Mixed Model (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). To establish the 
significance of the effect of the test predictors as a whole, we ran a likelihood ratio 
test (Dobson & Barnett, 2008) comparing the full model with a null model 
Study 1: Three-Year-Olds’ Reactions to a Partner’s Failure to Perform Her Role in a Joint 
Commitment 
 
 
41  
(Forstmeier & Schielzeth, 2011). Model stability was good, and neither collinearity 
nor overdispersion was an issue in the models. There was no effect of gender in 
any of the models. For each subject, we used both trials in the analyses, unless one 
of the trials was unusable (typically due to the partner’s deviating from the 
scripted behavior) in which case we only included the correctly acted-out trial (this 
was the case in ten dyads). 
2.3.2 Protest 
In the main model we analyzed the proportion of trials (out of the total number 
of usable trials) in which subjects protested, as well as which type of protest they 
used. The GLMM thus included condition, protest type (descriptive; personal; 
normative), the interaction of condition and protest type, and gender as fixed 
effects, and dyad-ID as a random effect. To account for some dyads having a 
different number of trials we also included the log-transformed number of trials as 
an offset term into the model. Overall the full model provided a significantly better 
fit compared to the null model (χ2 = 49.72, df = 8, p < 0.001). More specifically, 
there was an effect of condition (χ2 = 32.77, df = 2, p < 0.001) indicating that 
children protested in a higher proportion of trials in the Selfish condition than in 
both the Accidental condition (estimate ± SE = 1.62 ± 0.32, z = 5.11, p < 0.001) and 
the Ignorant condition (estimate ± SE = 0.95 ± 0.23, z = 4.05, p < 0.001). There was 
a trend for an interaction of condition and protest type (χ2 = 8.77, df = 4, p < 0.067), 
suggesting that the main effect of condition should be interpreted in this light (see 
Figure 3). Analyzing the effect of condition separately for each protest type 
revealed that subjects used more normative protest in the Selfish condition than 
in the Accidental condition (estimate ± SE = -2.34 ± 0.74, z = -3.16, p < 0.01) and 
the Ignorant condition (estimate ± SE = -1.07 ± 0.42, z = -2.57, p < 0.05).  They also 
used more personal protest in the Selfish condition than in the Accidental 
condition (estimate ± SE = 2.07 ± 0.53, z = -3.89, p < 0.001) and the Ignorant 
condition (estimate ± SE = -1.26 ± 0.36, z = -3.45, p < 0. 001). As hypothesized, 
there was no significant difference between conditions in descriptive protest. 
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Figure 3. Proportion of trials with different types of protest as a function of 
condition.  
 
2.3.3 Tattling 
We were also interested in the proportion of trials with different types of 
tattling. The main model consisted of condition, tattling type (neutral, apparatus 
blaming and partner blaming), the interaction of condition and tattling type, and 
gender as fixed effects, and dyad-ID as a random effect (and the log-transformed 
number of trials as an offset term). Overall the full model provided a significantly 
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better fit for the data than the null model (χ2 = 46.19, df = 8, p < 0.001). Further 
analyses revealed a significant interaction between condition and tattling type 
(χ2 = 38.76, df = 4, p < 0.001) indicating that subjects blamed the partner more in 
the Selfish condition than in the Ignorant condition (estimate ± SE = 0.76 ± 0.37 z 
= 2.03, p < 0.05). There was also a trend for subjects to blame the partner more in 
the Selfish condition than in the Accidental condition (estimate ± SE = 0.65 ± 0.37 
z = 1.74, p = 0.08). In contrast, blaming the apparatus was present more in the 
Accidental condition than in the Selfish condition (estimate ± SE = -1.76 ± 0.44 z = 
-3.98, p < 0.001) and more in the Ignorant condition than in the Selfish condition 
(estimate ± SE = -1.43 ± 0.45 z = -3.17, p < 0.01). Neutral statements without blame 
occurred more in the Selfish condition than in the Accidental condition (estimate 
± SE = 1.21 ± 0.47 z = 2.59, p < 0.01) and more in the Ignorant condition than in 
the Accidental condition (estimate ± SE = 1.28 ± 0.46 z = 2.8, p < 0.01) (see Figure 
4).   
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Figure 4. Proportion of trials with different types of tattling as a function of 
condition. 
 
2.3.4 Emotional Arousal 
Supporting this analysis, we also investigated children’s emotional arousal in 
a similar manner. Once again, results revealed a significant effect of condition 
(χ2 = 25.84, df = 2, p < 0.001), indicating that children were significantly more 
aroused in the Selfish condition than in both the Accidental condition (estimate ± 
SE = 1.36 ± 0.29, z = 4.71, p < 0.001) and the Ignorant condition (estimate ± SE = 
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0.42 ± 0.20, z = 2.01, p < 0.05) and more in the Ignorant condition than in the 
Accidental condition (estimate ± SE = -0.94 ± 0.3, z = -3.15, p < 0.01) (see Figure 
5). 
 
Figure 5. Subjects’ emotional arousal as a function of condition. 
 
2.3.5 Teaching 
In the main model for teaching we analyzed the proportion of trials (out of 2) in 
which subjects engaged in teaching behavior, as well as which type of teaching 
they used. The GLMM thus included condition, teaching type (descriptive, 
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personal, and normative), the interaction of condition and teaching type, and 
gender as fixed effects, and dyad-ID as a random effect. Again, to account for some 
dyads having a different number of trials, we also included the log-transformed 
number of trials as an offset term into the model.  Overall the full model provided 
a significantly better fit as compared to the null model (χ2 = 29.23, df = 8, 
p < 0.001). Further analyses revealed an effect of condition (χ2 = 26.73, df = 2, 
p < 0.001) indicating that children taught significantly more in the Ignorant 
condition than in both the Accidental condition (estimate ± SE = -2.19 ± 0.51 z = -
4.29, p < 0.001) and the Selfish condition (estimate ± SE = -1.03 ± 0.33, z = - 3.13, 
p < 0.01) and more in the Selfish condition than in the Accidental (estimate ± SE 
= 1.16 ± 0.55, z = 2.01, p < 0.05). There was no interaction between condition and 
teaching type (χ2 = 1.32, df = 4, p = 0.86) (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6. Proportion of trials with teaching (all types of teaching combined) as a 
function of condition. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
The current results suggest that three-year-old children understand the basic 
normativity involved in collaborative activities structured by a joint commitment, 
and that they react in basically adult-like ways to partner failure (Mathew & Boyd, 
2014). That is to say, three-year-old children act in socially and normatively 
appropriate ways when their collaborative partner fails to execute her 
collaborative role successfully - that is, fails to live up to her side of a joint 
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commitment - for various reasons. When their partner seemingly defected 
intentionally, they protested with relatively high emotional arousal and verbally 
blamed her for her failure. When their collaborative partner was ignorant of how 
to play her role, they protested and blamed less, but rather attempted to teach. 
When the apparatus failed, they behaved very differently, protesting against the 
partner very little, showing low emotional arousal, and verbally blaming the 
apparatus. Arguably, these are the kind of reactions that could be expected of a 
competent moral agent (or at least a competent normative agent) who treats her 
collaborative partner as another competent moral agent (Darwall, 2006). 
This conclusion is supported further by the interaction between the condition 
and protest type. Children protested significantly more with normative protest and 
personal protest in the Selfish condition than in the Ignorant and the Accidental 
conditions. However, there was no difference between conditions in the level of 
descriptive protest. While children are naturally frustrated and react with 
language that has descriptive relevance to the joint game if the task is interrupted 
for any reason, they react stronger, use more normative language (normative 
protest) and directly address their interaction partner (personal protest) if they 
think the partner intentionally broke the joint commitment. The outcome of an 
unsuccessful collaboration - inability for the subject child to receive his or her 
rewards - was the same in all three conditions, but their reactions were drastically 
different; thus, the children in our study correctly inferred and appropriately 
addressed the underlying intentions of their interaction partners. 
More specifically, children’s behavior in the current study was driven by their 
cognitive competencies for distinguishing (i) the intentions of the partner (in the 
Selfish and Accidental conditions) and (ii) the knowledge versus ignorance of the 
partner (in the Ignorant condition). Distinguishing intentional from accidental 
actions is clearly within the competence of three-year-old children, and indeed an 
ability that even toddlers possess (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998; Meltzoff, 
1995). Additionally, previous research has also shown that children of this age are 
able to distinguish knowledgeable from ignorant individuals (e.g., Moll, Carpenter, 
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& Tomasello, 2007; ONeill, 1996). The most reasonable interpretation, then, is that 
the children were applying well-known social-cognitive abilities but in a morally 
relevant context.   
In terms of protest, Josephs et al. (2015) found that in a third-party paradigm, 
3- and 4-year-old children protested more when an actor transgressed intentionally 
than when he or she produced the same outcome but had no ability to choose her 
actions. Interestingly, the children distinguished more between freely performed 
mistakes and mistakes that occurred under constraints when the situation was 
framed as a moral transgression, as opposed to a conventional transgression.  This 
result is generally consistent with the current results where children protested 
more against a defecting partner who acted seemingly freely than a partner who 
defected unintentionally.  The consistency of our results with the moral condition 
in the Josephs et al. (2015) study contributes to our interpretation of children’s 
reactions as morally relevant.  Tuncgenc et al. (2015) did not find three-year-olds 
protesting differently toward an agent's intentional versus unintentional 
transgressions: the children protested in both cases, whereas in our study children 
protested less if the failure was accidental. But in their study unintentional meant 
constrained from acting at all (hands tied), possibly making it ambiguous what the 
intentions could have been had the agent been free to act. In contrast, in the 
current study in the Accidental condition the partner child was clearly uninvolved 
in the accident (the apparatus broke).  The nature of the tasks used in Tuncgenc 
et al. (2015) vs Josephs et al. (2015) and the current study may also have 
contributed to the differences in results, as the “daxing” paradigm from Tuncgenc 
et al. (2015) falls into a conventional, as opposed to moral, transgression category.  
An interesting comparison in this regard is the study of Cushman, Sheketoff, 
Wharton, & Carey, (2013). They found that 4- to 8-year-old children showed a 
greater concern with the outcome of an action versus intent behind an action in 
their third-party punishment. The theoretical idea is that children (indeed persons 
of all ages) base their partner preferences on intent (preferring people with good 
intentions, as in Vaish et al., 2010, and Dunfield & Kuhlmeier, 2010), but they 
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punish on the basis of outcome (punishing those who cause harm whatever their 
intentions). The results from Cushman et al. (2013) might be seen as discrepant 
with ours, in which children took into account intent, and not outcome, in deciding 
whether to protest or teach. This discrepancy may be due to the difference between 
uninvolved third-party reactions and more salient second-personal reactions, and 
perhaps the special role that joint commitment plays in human social lives from 
early on. The case where I am the victim and you directly and intentionally violate 
your commitment to me may thus elicit more protest.  
Prior research suggests that toddlers may already be able to act as second-
personal moral agents in the sense of behaving prosocially toward specific other 
individuals (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). The current study demonstrates that by 
3.5 years of age, children understand the normative dimension of human action, 
involving impersonal normative standards and the obligation to live up to them 
when acting interdependently with others. When others violate the normative 
standards applying to them, the appropriate response is some type of normative 
protest. Protest manifests a respectful attitude towards a cooperative partner, 
since it assumes that he or she is a competent agent who knows what he or she did 
wrong and is able to self-correct as needed. By 3.5 years of age, children’s 
understanding of normative standards incorporates a nuanced appreciation of 
intentionality, which leads children to respond differently and appropriately in 
situations reflecting a partner’s differential intentions with regard to the joint 
obligation. The children thus not only act as second-personal normative agents but 
also understand and treat others as such. 
The current design investigating young children's joint commitment with a peer 
also tapped into young children's emotional involvement with a collaborator. Thus, 
when their partner defected intentionally, the children protested in an emotionally 
involved way, perhaps expressing the most basic second-personal emotion of 
resentment for being treated poorly by a supposedly cooperative partner 
(Strawson, 1974). This justified or legitimated their assessment of moral blame 
and so their protest (Smith, 2013). Importantly, this protest was quite often of a 
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normative nature: it is not just that I don't like it when you do that, but that one 
shouldn't do that. And quite often the protest was not specifically about the 
transgression - it was more like "Hey, what are you doing?" - which treats the 
partner as a second-personally cooperative agent who (i) knows what he or she has 
done wrong, and (ii) knows what to do to correct it. 
In addition, the current study is the first to show that three-year-old children 
understand that an ignorant partner is not responsible for the outcome of her 
actions in the context of joint commitment. They protest minimally when an 
ignorant partner does not do what they know they are supposed to do; instead, 
they attempt to teach them so as to turn their ignorance into knowledge, which 
presumably will result in more successful cooperative behavior. Koymen, Schmidt, 
Rost, Lieven, & Tomasello (2015) looked at some of the discourse features involved 
in young children's instruction versus protest, but children in that study did not 
need to distinguish different types of partners or violations. Although it is 
sometimes said that "ignorance is no excuse", the children in the current study 
seemingly believed that it is. Interestingly, children also engaged in teaching more 
in the Selfish condition than in the Accidental condition. This might reflect that, 
in comparison to the Accidental condition where there is nothing left to be done 
after the apparatus has broken, in the Selfish condition the game was not yet lost 
completely. As opposed to protest, teaching is a good way to get the partner back 
on track with goodwill.  
The current results thus add to a growing body of literature that even three-
year-old children have a good bit of normative competence. Beginning already in 
infancy, young children have an intrinsic motivation to help others in need (see 
Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2013, for a review), thus displaying the morally-
relevant emotion of sympathy toward needy others. The current study 
demonstrates, in addition, an emerging sense of respect, fairness, and obligation 
in the sense that an individual who jointly commits to a cooperative activity has 
an obligation to treat the partner as an equally deserving peer – by fulfilling the 
collaborative role to which he or she has committed. Obviously, children still have 
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much to learn about many aspects of adult normativity and morality, including the 
many nuances of intentionality, ignorance, and the resulting assignment of blame, 
and they only know a small subset of the moral norms characteristic of their 
culture. But the fundamental skills and motivations for engaging with others 
directly as normative agents who should be treated with sympathy and fairness 
seem to be in place by three years of age. 
Importantly, unlike much of previous research on joint action and intention 
understanding that has used either adult partners, puppets manipulated by 
adults, or hypothetical situations presented by adults, children in the current 
study interacted with their peers. Training participants’ age mates as naive 
confederates allowed to test children’s competences under very conservative 
conditions, without adult guidance, scaffolding, or attention management. 
Critically for our theoretical perspective, forming and acting on a joint commitment 
with a peer recreates a prototypical situation of a second-personal standpoint 
(Darwall, 2006) where the interaction unfolds between equals and thus involves 
mutual moral obligations. 
A few limitations of our study should be noted. One of them is that because of 
the complicated nature of the task and especially because we were interested in 
normative protest between peers, we could not test children younger than 3.5 years 
of age. It is possible that younger children could already have some understanding 
of what breaking a joint commitment entails. Perhaps future studies could use 
simplified paradigms and measures (e.g., nonverbal) to see if younger children 
could make the distinctions that the children in our study made.  On the other 
hand, testing older children in a paradigm similar to ours could help track the 
developmental progression of understanding and enforcing collaborative norms.  
We could predict, for example, that the differences in the type of language the 
children use in different conditions would become more pronounced with age.  Also, 
additional measures, indexing perspective-taking, theory of mind, status in the 
group, quality of prior relationships between the partners, etc., could be 
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administered along with this task to explore individual differences in children’s 
propensity to protest against norm violations.  
Another potential issue with our study - and a potential theme for further 
investigation - is the context in which we situated our collaborative task. Recent 
research has shown that the way in which collaborative rules are learned (i.e. 
whether rules apply to the self vs others and whether they are presented in the 
prescriptive vs proscriptive form) influences the strength of 4- to 7-year-old 
children’s normative judgments (Riggs & Young, 2016). One could argue that 
children may also react to violations of commitment differently in the context 
where norms and commitments are generated by adults as opposed to a more 
spontaneous context characteristic of natural peer interactions. In the current 
study, we found that three-year-old children were able to distinguish and react 
appropriately to intentional vs unintentional commitment violations in a specific, 
controlled situation where an adult “handed down” the task, elicited an explicit 
acknowledgment of joint commitment, and made the interdependent nature of the 
task clear to the subjects.  It is possible that children would have been less 
indignated and more forgiving of their peers if a violation happened in a less 
structured environment. Among other variables, the degree to which joint 
commitment is explicitly communicated between partners (which probably 
happens infrequently in unstructured peer interactions) could be a factor worthy 
of future investigation. 
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3 Study 2: Three- and 5-year-old children’s adherence to explicit 
and implicit joint commitments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The problem with collaboration is that there are temptations to defect. Explicit 
joint commitments are designed to mitigate some of the risks, but people also feel 
committed to others implicitly when they both know together that they each hold 
the others fate in their hands. In the current study, pairs of three-year-old and 
five-year-old children (N = 192) played a collaborative game. One child was offered 
individual rewards (“bribed”) to opt out of the collaboration. In three different 
conditions the level of the commitment was manipulated. Three-year-old children 
were more likely to resist the bribes when there was an explicit joint commitment 
to the partner than when they were only playing in parallel, with their reactions 
to an implicit commitment falling in between. Five-year-olds were more likely to 
resist bribes in both the implicit and explicit commitment conditions than in the 
no commitment condition. Thus, children at both ages showed some level of 
commitment to a collaborative partner in the face of bribes to defect, but only five-
year-olds clearly appreciated that a common ground understanding of 
interdependence between partners generates an implicit commitment or 
obligation.  
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3.1 Introduction 
Collaboration can be risky, as one depends on one's partner who might, in some 
circumstances, be tempted to abandon the enterprise. As a consequence, people 
often make joint commitments at the outset to ensure that they both, for example, 
play their roles appropriately, persist in the face of difficulties, and share the spoils 
equitably at the end. Basically, the joint commitment puts individuals under 
normative pressure to keep the well-being of their partner in mind during the 
collaboration. 
Joint commitments are often made explicitly in language: I say "Let's do X” and 
you say “Okay" (Gilbert, 1990). In principle, one could even be more explicit by 
using the word promise or something similar. But individuals can also feel jointly 
committed to one another implicitly if they are interdependent with one another 
and, crucially, it is in their common ground understanding that they are. For 
example, if Person A carpools home every evening with Person B so reliably that 
when it is B’s turn, A forgoes all other means of transportation with no backups – 
and A and B both know that this is the case – then B feels obliged to give A a ride 
home, give A fair warning, or give A a good excuse. Thus, Michael and colleagues 
(2016b) found that when a collaborative activity required more interdependent 
coordination between adult individuals, they felt a greater sense of commitment to 
their partner. An encompassing explanation is that the fundamental basis of a 
joint commitment is the partners’ common ground understanding that they hold 
the fate of the other in their hands: they each know that each of them must live up 
to their shared expectations if they are to jointly succeed. The explicit joint 
commitment is simply a way to ramp up the common ground understanding so 
that there can be no misunderstanding. 
Young children begin collaborating with adults in simple activities from soon 
after their first birthdays (Warneken et al., 2006; Warneken & Tomasello, 2007). 
They seem to form with the adult a joint goal to do something together, even 
reengaging her if she is not collaborating appropriately (Warneken et al., 2012). 
But collaborating with peers is more challenging. Brownell and Carriger (1990; 
1991) found that it was not until 2 or 2.5 years of age that children could coordinate 
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with a peer relatively smoothly and successfully. But in neither of these early kinds 
of collaborative activities would there seem to be a sense of commitment with 
obligation to the partner. Thus, Gräfenhain and colleagues (2009, Study 1) found 
that, in contrast to 3-year-olds, 2-year-olds did not persist in collaborating in a 
situation in which they formed an explicit joint commitment to a partner any more 
than in a situation in which they did not. Similarly, Hamann and colleagues (2012) 
found that 2-year-olds, again in contrast to 3-year-olds, did not persist in helping 
a partner reach her goal more in a collaborative than in a non-collaborative 
context. One possibility is that 2-year-olds may re-engage a partner because they 
feel it is more fun to do things collaboratively, but they do not, as do 3-year-olds, 
take joint commitments to bind them to persistence in the face of temptations to 
do other things. 
The clearest signs of an understanding of joint commitment emerges at around 
three years of age when children begin to use normative language (e.g., should, 
must) in the context of collaboration, and also to make excuses for defection. Thus, 
Kachel, Svetlova, and Tomasello (2018) found that 3-year-old children understood 
that making an explicit joint commitment to a peer partner meant that one had to 
fulfill one’s role in a way that helped the team to joint success, and indeed children 
protested against a peer not playing her role appropriately using explicitly 
normative language (e.g., No, you must do X). Gräfenhain and colleagues (2009, 
Study 2) found that after making an explicit joint commitment with an adult 
(orchestrated by the adult, but explicitly agreed to by the child), 3- and 4-year-old 
children were loath to break it, "taking leave” or otherwise verbally acknowledging 
the commitment if they had reneged. Kanngiesser et al., (2017) found that 3- and 
5-year-old children were more likely to keep performing a boring task if they had 
explicitly promised an adult to do so, and when their partner reneged on a promise 
they again protested with normative language.  
But just as in adults, under the right conditions young children can also enter 
into an implicit joint commitment. Hamann et al., (2012) found that 3-year-old 
peers (but not 2-year-old peers) helped one another more readily if they were 
collaborating - with a common ground understanding that they were 
Study 2: Three- and 5-year-old children’s adherence to explicit and implicit joint commitments 
 
 
57  
interdependent with one another for joint success - than if they were not 
collaborating. Likewise, Hamann et al., (2011) found that 3-year-old peers (but 
again not 2-year-old peers) shared the spoils of the collaboration with one another 
more readily if they were collaborating - again presumably with a common ground 
understanding that they were interdependent with one another for joint success - 
than if they were not collaborating. The peers feel they are obligated to keep the 
partner's well-being in mind - even without a verbally expressed explicit joint 
commitment - because they know together in common ground the effects that each 
of their actions has on the other. 
Looking across studies, we may question the role of explicit versus implicit joint 
commitments. It may be the case that adults honor both types of commitment 
equally because the implicit version, like the explicit version, makes their 
dependence on one another clearly manifest and salient to them both (e.g., when 
we both see the need to move an obstacle together and just begin doing so). But it 
might be, developmentally, that young children first need to experience explicit 
joint commitments in language (and the consequences of breaking them) before 
implicit joint commitments would feel binding to them. The opposite possibility is 
that the re-engagement attempts of toddlers have already started children on the 
road to an appreciation of joint commitments, and learning to verbalize the 
commitment is simply making the implicit explicit.  
In the current study, therefore, we explored the development of children's sense 
of commitment to a peer partner when they had made either an explicit or implicit 
joint commitment. The strength of their commitment was measured by their 
behavior when faced with a material reward or temptation to defect from the 
collaboration. As a baseline, children also participated in a condition in which they 
were simply playing beside a peer in parallel. We tested 3- and 5-year-old children 
because previous research suggests that by the age of three children possess the 
competence to collaborate effectively with a peer partner (e.g., Hamann et al. 2001, 
2012; Kachel et al. 2018). Our question was whether children this young would 
persist in collaborating in the face of strong temptations to defect (presented at 
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two different strengths), and whether their persistence would be different at the 
different ages depending on whether the commitment was implicit versus explicit. 
3.2 Methods 
3.2.1 Participants  
Participants were 96 3.5-year-old children (M = 43,7 months, SD =2,1; 48 boys;) 
and 96 5.5-year-old children (M = 66,1 months, SD =1,6; 48 boys;) of heterogeneous 
socioeconomic backgrounds (predominantly middle-class and Caucasian) 
attending preschool in a medium-sized German city. Prior to the study, parents 
had given informed consent for their children’s participation. Children were tested 
in same-sex dyads. In each dyad only one child was an actual subject; the second 
child (hereafter the partner) was trained as a confederate but remained naïve to 
that. Children were randomly assigned to the three experimental conditions and 
their role in the dyad (subject or partner). Sixteen additional dyads were tested 
but excluded from analyses due to errors in the procedure: experimenter (n=2), 
camera malfunction (n=1), inattentiveness of the subject or partner child (n=5), 
failed pretest (n=8). Dyads were trained and tested in a quiet room in their 
kindergarten in a session lasting approximately 60 minutes. The procedure of this 
study (“Children’s adherence to explicit and implicit joint commitments”) was 
approved by the Child Subjects Committee of the Max Planck Institute for 
Evolutionary Anthropology. 
3.2.2 Materials and Design  
Participants were tested in three conditions (Parallel-play condition, Implicit-
commitment condition and Explicit-commitment condition) in a between-subjects 
design. In all three conditions subjects and their partners were trained to obtain 
two wooden beads (one for each child, in order to make a bracelet later) from an 
apparatus. The apparatus was a modified version of the apparatus used by 
Hamann et al. (2011; 2014). In order to obtain the beads, both children had to pull 
on a rope to move a block towards the two beads. The block then moved and pushed 
the beads from their platform and they rolled towards two separate openings 
where the players could retrieve them. According to the three experimental 
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conditions the subject and her partner were either independent and could acquire 
their bead each by themselves (Parallel-play condition), they were dependent on 
one another and knew this (Implicit-commitment condition) or they were 
dependent on each other and made an explicit joint commitment (Explicit-
commitment condition). In the implicit-commitment and the Explicit-commitment 
conditions, pulling on the rope alone was ineffective because the block would not 
move and accessing both ends of the rope was impossible (Figure 7 Panels B & C). 
This created the necessity for collaboration. In the Parallel-play condition, each 
child had a separate block to access their bead inside of the apparatus and could 
therefore be successful alone (Figure 7A).  
As children confronted the task, their ropes were not immediately accessible 
but had to be retrieved from within a forced choice panel. The panel consisted of 
two chambers such that opening one would block the other. During the test trials 
one chamber contained the rope allowing them to collaborately pull with the 
partner, and the other contained a “bribe” reward to induce them to defect from 
the collaboration. Manipulated within subjects across trials, the bribe was either 
of a low value (double the reward for collaboration: 2 vs 1) or a high value 
(quadruple the reward for collaboration: 4 vs 1). A barrier between the two children 
prevented that both children could easily see which chamber of the forced choice 
panel the play partner decided to open and what each chamber contained. Dyads 
were randomly assigned to the three experimental conditions; within each dyad, 
children were randomly assigned to their role in the dyad (subject or partner). 
3.2.3 Procedure 
Dyads of children were picked up in their classroom and brought to the test 
room by the lead experimenter (E1). After a brief familiarization, both children 
received two joint training trials with E1 and an assistant (E2) to learn the rope 
pulling game and the mechanism of the forced choice panels. The training ensured 
that both children understood together the interdependent or parallel aspect of the 
game in their condition, that is, that one partner could not pull and retrieve the 
rewards if the other did not participate (in the implicit-commitment and the 
Explicit-commitment conditions, Figure 7 Panel B & C) or that one partner could 
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pull and retrieve the reward without the other partners’ help (in the Parallel-play 
condition, Figure 7A). Furthermore, both children learned to stay quiet and to only 
open one of the chambers after a signal from E1 (knocking on the door). Both 
children collected their beads in an opaque container to make sure that they could 
not keep track of how many beads they already collected or who collected more. 
Then both children received two separate training trials with E1 while the other 
child was outside with E2. 
Separate training for the subject child. In the separate training trials for the 
subject the children were familiarized with the situation that both chambers of the 
forced choice panel can be baited and that they could choose what they prefer. In 
both of these separate training trials the rope was not assessable. One chamber 
(where in the previous training trials and the following test trials the rope was 
placed) was baited with a single bead; the other was baited with three beads. In 
order to progress to the test trials subjects had to show a preference for three over 
one bead in both trials. This served as a preference test to show that children 
generally prefer more rewards over fewer rewards and to make sure that children 
did not have a side bias towards the rope chamber (after a passed preference test 
both sides were opened equally often in the training trials) and would feel 
comfortable to choose freely between the rope and the offered bribe in the test 
trials. Furthermore, E1 told the subject children that beads from their forced 
choice panel only go in their bead collector. 
Separate training for the partner child. In the separate training trials for the 
partner child E1 repeated the procedure from the rope pulling game and played 
with the partner child. The force choice panel of the partner child was only baited 
with the rope, the other chamber remained empty. Furthermore, E1 told the 
partner child that E2 had additional secret beads and would give them to her if E2 
called for her (this ensured that the partner child would not end up empty-handed 
if the subject child accepted the bribe reward in the test trials). 
Pretest trial. In a pretest trial E1 called the subject in the test room first. E1 
and the subject then looked at both forced choice panels. E1 pointed out what 
options the partner child and the subject had (in both forced choice panels one 
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chamber was empty and one contained the rope). Then, E1 reminded the subject 
that he or she could choose to open whichever chamber. Lastly, E1 asked the 
subject if the partner could pull the block in the apparatus alone or not. Children 
in the Parallel-play condition had to answer with “yes” (Figure 7 A), and children 
in the Implicit-commitment and the Explicit-commitment conditions (Figure 7 B 
& C) had to answer with “no”; otherwise they were reminded. After that E1 called 
in the partner child. Then, children in the Explicit-commitment condition were 
encouraged to form an explicit joint commitment before each trial (pretest and test 
trials); that is, E1 asked each child whether they would play the game again 
together with the other child. Both children had to agree verbally and were asked 
to “high five” with the partner (Figure 7 C). To pass the pretest trial both children 
had to open the right chamber of the forced choice panel (the one containing the 
rope) and pull together. After that the test trials followed. 
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Figure 7 A Parallel-play condition 
 
Figure 7 B Implicit-commitment condition 
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Figure 7 C Explicit-commitment condition 
 
Figure 7. Schematics for the three conditions. In all three conditions the partner 
child’s only option is the rope for the pulling game. The subject can choose between 
the rope and the bribe that is offered in the second chamber of the forced choice 
panel. In the Parallel-play condition (Panel A) each child has her own block and 
can pull independently; in the Implicit-commitment condition (Panel B) there is 
only one block for both children creating the interdependence between both 
players; and in the Explicit-commitment condition (Panel C) there is again only 
one block for both children creating interdependence and on top both children form 
an explicit joint commitment to pull together (verbally and with a High Five). 
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Test trials. The 6 test trials proceeded exactly like the pretest trial. E1 pointed 
out that in the partner child’s forced choice panel one chamber was empty and one 
contained the rope. But in the subject’s forced choice panel one chamber now 
contained the bribe (either two or four beads) and one contained the rope. Then, 
E1 reminded the subject that she could choose to open whichever chamber she 
wished. The value of the bribe reward (high or low) was alternated across trials, 
and whether the first bribe was a high or a low offer was counterbalanced across 
dyads. 
Whenever the subject child chose to open the chamber containing the bribe, E2 
immediately called for the partner child and secretly gave additional beads to her. 
That way, the partner child stayed happy and clueless about the bribery of the 
subject child. Neither E1, nor E2 commented or talked about the subject’s choices 
and E2 prevented the children from talking about the game while E1 set up the 
next trial. The children were not given any information about how many trials they 
were to play. E1 simply announced that there would be yet another trial by saying: 
‘Okay, I’ll hide beads again’. 
After the 6 test trials a “same outcome test trial” was administered. In this 
trial, the subject’s forced choice panel was baited with a single bead in one of the 
chambers and the rope in the other (thus making cooperation and defection equally 
rewarding).  
Dictator Game. After the last test trial, the subject children and E1 were alone 
in the test room and the subject played a Dictator Game. E1 announced that she 
found five additional beads and that the subjects could divide them in any way 
they want by placing them on two plates (one for the subject, one for the partner 
child).  
After the Dictator Game the partner child had a chance to add his or her 
additional beads from E2 into their bead collector. Then, without the children 
present, E1 made sure that both children would have the same number of beads in 
their collectors before calling them back in the test room to make their bracelets. 
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3.2.4  Coding and Reliability 
We recorded in each trial whether the subject accepted the bribe (opened the 
chamber containing the bribe instead of the chamber containing the rope) and their 
allocation in the Dictator Game.  All of the sessions were videotaped and coded by 
a primary coder. To establish reliability, a naïve coder who was blind to the 
conditions and the hypotheses of the study coded a randomly selected sample of 
20% of the data in each condition. The two coders were in perfect agreement 
(Cohen’s κ = 1). 
3.3 Results 
In the main analysis, we looked at the number of bribe rewards subject children 
accepted out of six test trials. The last test trial of two subjects had to be excluded 
due to an apparatus failure. The Generalized Linear Mixed Model (Baayen et al., 
2008) included condition, age, bribe value (high; low), the interaction of condition, 
bribe value and age, gender and trial number as fixed effects, and dyad-ID as a 
random effect. To keep type I error rates at the level of 5% we included random 
slopes of bribe value and trial number within dyad-ID but not the correlation 
parameters among the random intercept and random slopes terms (Barr, Levy, 
Scheepers, & Tily, 2013; Schielzeth & Forstmeier 2009). To establish the 
significance of the effect of the test predictors as a whole, we ran a likelihood ratio 
test (Dobson & Barnett, 2008) comparing the full model with a null model 
(Forstmeier & Schielzeth, 2011). Overall the full model provided a significantly 
better fit compared to the null model χ2(12, N = 96) = 67.61, p < 0.001. The three-
way interaction of condition, bribe value and age was not significant χ2(2, N = 96) 
= 0.89, p = 0.64. Therefore, we dropped it from the analysis. The reduced model 
included condition, age, bribe value, the interaction of condition and age, the 
interaction of condition and bribe value and the interaction of bribe value and age, 
gender as a fixed effect, as well as dyad-ID and trial number as random effects. 
The reduced model was significantly better at explaining the data than the null 
model χ2(10, N = 96) = 66.73, p < 0.001. 
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Of most importance, we found an effect of condition χ2(2, N = 96) = 34.06, 
p < 0.001, indicating that children resisted bribes more in both the Implicit-
commitment (p < 0.001) and Explicit-commitment conditions (p < 0.001) than in 
the Parallel-play condition (see Figure 8). Moreover, they resisted bribes more in 
the Explicit-commitment condition than in the Implicit-commitment condition (p 
= 0.03). This result suggests that preschool children already appreciate the force 
of joint commitments to collaborate and, in addition, a difference in force between 
explicit and only implicit joint commitments.  
As can also be seen in Figure 8 the pattern was different at the two ages, and 
indeed there was a statistical trend toward an interaction of condition and age 
χ2(2, N = 96) = 5.37, p = 0.067. The most obvious difference was that the 5-year-
olds felt free to accept the bribe in the absence of a joint commitment (i.e., in the 
Parallel-play condition) almost twice as often as the 3-year olds. This might reflect 
their greater experience with joint commitments, such that their absence is both 
salient and significant. Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests of the effect of condition 
separately for each age group revealed that 3-year-olds resisted bribes more often 
in the Explicit-commitment than in the Parallel-play condition (z = -2.83, p = 
0.004), but did not distinguish between the Implicit-commitment condition and 
either of the other two (Figure 8 A). In contrast, 5-year-olds resisted bribes more 
often in both the Implicit-commitment (z = -3.49, p < 0.001) and the Explicit-
commitment conditions (z = -4.22, p < 0.001) than in the Parallel-play condition. 
Although the two commitment conditions did not differ from one another for the 5-
year-olds, still it was the case that, unlike the 3-year-olds, the 5-year-olds clearly 
differentiated the condition in which there was only an implicit joint commitment 
from that in which there was no commitment at all. 
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Figure 8 A 
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Figure 8 B 
 
Figure 8. Proportion of trials in which (Panel A) 3-year-olds’ and (Panel B) 5-year-
olds’ resisted the bribe across conditions. Error bars indicate standard error of the 
mean. Please note, we found a significant effect of condition (p < 0.001) in our 
model, the interaction of condition and age is a trend (p = 0.067). ** p < .01. *** p< 
.001. 
 
We also found an effect of trial χ2(1, N = 96) = 10.79, p = 0.001 indicating that 
children resisted bribes more over the course of the six trials (z = -3.38, p < 0.001), 
probably because obtaining even more beads became less interesting over trials.  
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There was also a trend for an effect of gender χ2(1, N = 96) = 3.02, p =0.08 
indicating that boys resisted bribes more than girls (z = 1.77, p < 0.08). 
Furthermore, there was a significant interaction of bribe value and age χ2(1) 
= 4.49, p = 0.03, such that 3-year-olds resisted bribes more often when they were 
of a lower value (z = 2.20, p = 0.03), and this effect was even more pronounced in 
5-year-old children (z = 4.36, p < 0.001). Finally, the interaction of condition and 
bribe value was not significant χ2(2, N = 96) = 1.71, p = 0.43. 
We were also interested in whether children preferred to work collaboratively 
with their partner child (choose the rope) or accept a bribe of the exact same 
outcome (choose the bribe) in the additional “same outcome test trial” as previous 
research has shown that children prefer collaborative over individual work if the 
outcome is the same (Rekers, Haun, & Tomasello, 2011). With either option, they 
would get one bead for themselves and, if they choose to pull collaboratively with 
the partner, one bead for their partner. Again, we analyzed the mean acceptance 
of the bribe reward, but here there was just one test trial. Three subjects had to be 
excluded from the analysis because they did not receive the same outcome trial due 
to an apparatus failure. To model the impact of condition, age, and gender on 
children’s acceptance of the same outcome bribe we used a Generalized Linear 
Model with binomial error structure and logit link function (McCullagh & Nelder, 
1989). The full model did not provide a significantly better fit compared to the null 
model χ2(4, N = 93) = 62.69, p = 0.29. Thus, none of the test predictors had an 
obvious effect on the acceptance of the one bead bribe. To test whether children’s 
choices for either option were above chance, we ran one-sample t-tests for each 
condition separately with the chance level set to 1/2. As hypothesized, children’s 
resistance of the bribe was above chance in all three conditions: Implicit-
commitment condition (t(30) = -5.04, p < 0.001); Explicit-commitment condition 
(t(30) = -14.50, p < 0.001), and Parallel-play condition (t(30) = -5.04, p < 0.001). 
This suggests that, for the same reward, children of both ages preferred 
collaboration to individual effort - making sure that their partner would end up 
with one bead instead of nothing. In line with Rekers et al. (2011), even in the 
Parallel-play condition subjects preferred to work collaboratively instead of 
individually for the same outcome (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9. Subjects’ resistance to one bead bribes as a function of condition. Error 
bars indicate standard error of the mean. The dashed line indicates chance level.  
 
Finally, we were interested how children would allocate five additional beads 
that were handed to them after the game was over. We counted how many of those 
five beads children kept for themselves and used a GLM with poisson error 
structure and log link function (McCullagh & Nelder, 1989) for the analysis. We 
analyzed whether condition, age, gender and children’s bribe accepting behavior 
in the previous test trials influenced their allocation. The full model did not provide 
a significantly better fit compared to the null model χ2(4, N = 96) = 33.21, p = 0.96. 
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Thus, none of the test predictors had an obvious effect on children’s allocation of 
the additional beads. Visual inspection of the data shows that most children either 
kept all five beads for themselves or kept three beads and gave two beads to their 
partner (Table 2). 
 
 Number of beads 
 1 2 3 4 5 
3-year-olds 0 
0% 
7  
14,58% 
18  
37,5% 
1  
2,08% 
22  
45,83% 
5-year-olds 0 
0% 
6  
12,5% 
24  
50% 
2  
4,17% 
16  
33,33% 
Table 2. 
 Numbers and percentages of children that kept one through five beads for 
themselves in the Dictator Game as a function of age 
 
3.4 Discussion 
The most general result of the current study was that when preschool children 
make a joint commitment with a peer to collaborate, their sense of commitment is 
strong enough that they resist fairly strong selfish temptations to break it. It is 
conceivable that what the children were demonstrating was not a sense of 
commitment but rather a simple preference: the Explicit-commitment and 
Implicit-commitment conditions were so much fun that children preferred 
continuing to collaborate in them rather than take the selfish option (whereas the 
Parallel-play condition was not as much fun). However, the current study was 
designed to be highly similar to other studies (e.g., Kachel et al., 2018), and in 
those studies children objected to partner defections with normative language such 
as You must not do it this way, You have to do it that way, and so forth. Our 
assumption here, then, is that children are assessing their own potential defection 
in this same normative way, and, in some cases, deciding that they should not 
defect. This interpretation is also consistent with other studies of children in this 
same age range who protest using normative language when others break rules 
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(see Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012, for a review), or who feel guilt when they 
themselves carelessly cause harm  to others (Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 
2016), or who give up resources in their possession (which they otherwise would 
not give up) to a collaborative partner in order to achieve a just distribution of the 
spoils (Hamann et al., 2011). 
In addition, the preference explanation cannot account for the difference 
between the Explicit-commitment and Implicit-commitment conditions. These 
conditions were identical except for the explicit joint commitment itself, and so 
their "fun-value" should have been identical. But, in the overall sample, children 
resisted bribes better in the Explicit-commitment condition, perhaps suggesting 
that the explicit joint commitment somehow felt more binding to them. In the adult 
literature, the proposal is that making an explicit joint commitment effectively 
prevents me from pleading ignorance and making the excuse that I didn't realize 
we had a commitment (as I can more plausibly do in the case of an only implicit 
commitment; Pettit, 2018). Indeed, one could think of written legal contracts as 
simply one further explicit step along the lines of making sure that there is no 
misunderstanding about the content of the agreement. 
Differences between 3-year-olds and 5-year-olds in the study were not large, 
but were nevertheless detectable. Inspection of the graphs reveals that the main 
difference was that 5-year-olds were much quicker to take the bribe when there 
was no joint commitment (i.e., in the Parallel-play condition) than were the 3-year-
olds. Two explanations suggest themselves. One is that the 3-year-olds simply 
found the independent rope pulling game in the Parallel-play condition more fun 
than did the 5-year-olds, such that they ignored the bribes (whereas the game 
requiring both partners – in the two commitment conditions - was equally fun for 
both ages). The other possibility is that 3-year-olds are kind of “promiscuous 
normativists” (Schmidt & Tomasello, 2012) such that any time they are playing 
next to one another, even if it is in parallel, they see it as a kind of collaboration 
with an implicit commitment, whereas 5-year-olds differentiate more clearly 
among collaborative interactions based on how they are initiated. The reason that 
5-year-olds differentiate types of social interaction more clearly than do 3-year-
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olds, on the current hypothesis, is that they have had much more experience 
collaborating and making joint commitments on their own with peers. And peer 
experience – e.g., being abandoned by a partner on whom one depends - is crucial 
for understanding the importance of explicit joint commitments, which are 
designed precisely to prevent such defection. Relatedly, since 5-year-olds, but not 
3-year-olds, are actively concerned about their reputations with others 
(Engelmann et al., 2016; Piazza, Bering, & Ingram, 2011), perhaps they are more 
highly motivated to discover what actions have ramifications for their reputations 
and which, like those in the Parallel-play condition, do not.  
At first glance, the findings with 3-year-olds might seem to conflict with those 
of Hamann et al., (2011, 2012), who found that simply entering into a collaboration 
with a peer partner (an implicit commitment) led children to help their partner 
more and share with her more than did parallel play. Arguably, however, such 
helping and sharing in the context of an ongoing collaboration are easier for 
children than resisting material rewards for opting out, as in the current study. In 
addition, it is important that in those previous studies children helped or shared 
with their partner, either more or less, after the collaboration was already ongoing, 
whereas in the current study the child’s decision was about whether to collaborate 
at all – arguably a much weightier decision. 
A further step along this same developmental path might be for children to 
make joint commitments spontaneously, and they do so on some occasions with 
such interactions as "Let's do X” and “Okay". But in point of fact they do not make 
such explicit joint commitments so frequently (Melis & Warneken, 2016). This may 
be due to the fact that explicit joint commitments are only necessary when (i) 
partners depend on one another in important ways such that defection causes 
harm, and (ii) there is some question about whether partners will be motivated 
enough to persist through distractions and temptations to defect. In play 
interactions, which are the main form of interaction in young peers, the 
interdependence is not so great in the sense that defection does not cause great 
harm. Alternatively, it simply may not occur to young children, especially in the 
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preschool period, that someone might change their preferences in the middle of 
their social interaction. 
Along these lines, one could argue that because an adult orchestrated the 
explicit joint commitment in our study, the children not only felt committed to the 
peer partner and their joint play but also to the adult who arranged their consent 
to play together - and this contributed to our results. This is possible, but to tone 
down her role in the process the experimenter initiated things in a playful manner 
and also reminded children before each trial that they could choose whichever 
chamber of the forced choice panel they wanted - and left the room before the 
collaboration began. Also, previous research on children’s understanding of joint 
commitments where the adult arranged nothing (e.g., Gräfenhain et al., 2009; 
Hamann et al., 2011, 2012) show that "pressure" from an adult is not necessary for 
the children to feel a commitment to their peer partner. In either case, an 
interesting future line of research might be to see the conditions under which 
young children are motivated to make spontaneous and explicit joint 
commitments. 
Finally, we observed that children’s bead allocation in the Dictator Game was 
not influenced by any of our test predictors. The majority of children in our study 
kept three or all five additional beads for themselves. This pattern is in line with 
previous work on children’s behavior in the Dictator Game (Benenson, Pascoe, & 
Radmore, 2007; Blake, Corbit, Callaghan, & Warneken, 2016). Although 
collaboration reduced children’s tendensies to accept the bribe in the pulling game, 
there was no increase in sharing the additional windfall beads afterwards, even 
though the resource and the parnter were the same. A study by Corbit, McAuliffe, 
Callaghan, Blake, & Warneken (2017) found that five-year-olds start to reject 
disadvantageous resource distributions after collaboration (and even 
advantageous resource distributions starting between 7 and 8 years of age). 
However, the shared resources in their study were the ones obtained during the 
collaboration whereas in our study they were additional beads from the 
experimenter. 
Study 2: Three- and 5-year-old children’s adherence to explicit and implicit joint commitments 
 
 
75  
The current results thus contribute to a growing body of work that at around 
three years of age, young children take what may be called a normative turn. It is 
at this age that they first begin to enforce social norms on others (Schmidt & 
Tomasello, 2012). It is at this age that they first began to have a sense of fairness 
in the division of spoils after a collaborative activity (Hamann et al., 2011). And it 
is at this age that they begin to use normative language like ought, must, and 
should, perhaps especially when protesting against moral and conventional 
violations (Koymen et al., 2014; Rakoczy et al., 2008; Wyman, Rakoczy, & 
Tomasello, 2009). This normative turn indicates that young children have begun 
to enter into a new world in which the question is not just what someone is thinking 
or doing, but rather what they should be thinking or should be doing in the eyes of 
the larger social community. 
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4 Study 3: Three- and 5-year-old children’s understanding of how 
to dissolve a joint commitment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
When young children form a joint commitment with a partner, they understand 
that this agreement generates obligations. In this study I investigated whether 
young children understand that joint commitments, and their associated 
obligations, may likewise be dissolved by agreement. Three- and 5-year-old 
children (N = 144) formed a joint commitment with a puppet to play a collaborative 
game. In one condition, the puppet asked permission to break off and the child 
agreed; in a second condition the puppet notified the child of its leaving; and in a 
third condition the puppet just left abruptly. Children at both ages protested more 
and waited longer for the puppet’s return (and said he deserved scolding and no a 
prize at the end) when the puppet left abruptly than in the other two conditions 
(with ‘asking permission’ leading to the least protest of all). Overall, 3-year-olds 
protested more, and waited longer for the partner’s return, than did 5-year-olds. 
Preschool children understand that the obligations of a joint commitment may be 
dissolved by agreement or, to a lesser degree, by notification.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Joint commitments have been called the “social atoms” of distinctively human 
social interaction (Gilbert, 2003). They are social atoms because they are the 
simplest form of normative connection between human individuals in which they 
come to owe something to one another. Whereas social norms are the collective 
expectations of the social group for individual behavior, joint commitments are 
made directly between individuals. Whereas social norms exist before the 
individual is even born, joint commitments are voluntarily created. And whereas 
the individual has virtually no possibility of dissolving or altering societal-level 
norms, she can dissolve or alter joint commitments at will – that is, if (and only if) 
her partner agrees. That is because the bi-directional normative obligations 
created by a joint commitment cannot (without consequence) be canceled 
unilaterally: each partner is obligated to follow through on the joint commitment 
unless and until they agree to do otherwise. 
Children display some understanding of joint commitments from around 3 
years of age. Prior to this age they collaborate with both adults and peers 
(Warneken et al., 2006; Brownell & Carriger, 1991), but there are no reliable signs 
that they are normatively committed to the collaboration. By 3 years of age there 
are several types of evidence that collaboration generates a different kind of 
relationship between children and their collaborative partners. Thus, 3-year-olds, 
but not 2-year-olds, help their partner get her reward more often while they are 
collaborating than if they are not (Hamann et al., 2012). Similarly, 3-year-olds but 
not 2-year-olds tend to divide the spoils of a collaborative activity “fairly" more 
often if they are collaborating than if they are merely acting in parallel (Hamann 
et al., 2011). The conclusion is that collaboration by itself tends to create a sense 
that “we“ are doing this together, and so we should treat each other with special 
respect. 
But, in addition, at 3 years of age children also show signs that they feel the 
special normative force of explicitly made joint commitments. Gräfenhain et al. 
(2009, Study 1) had an adult orchestrate a joint commitment with a child (Adult: 
“Let’s play X”; Child: “OK”). In contrast to a situation in which the adult simply 
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joined the child in her play unbidden, if they made a joint commitment, 3-year-
olds, but not 2-year-olds, waited longer for their partner and tried more 
persistently to reengage her when she broke off. Similarly, Gräfenhain et al. (2009) 
found that when 3-year-old children made a joint commitment to collaborate with 
a (puppet) partner, as opposed to merely playing beside the partner, they more 
often did such things as: wait for their partner when she was delayed, repair 
damage done by their partner, refrain from tattling on their partner, and perform 
their partner’s role for her when she was unable. Finally, 3- and 5-year-olds 
persisted longer at a boring cleaning task if they had agreed with an adult 
(“promised”) to do so than if they had made no such explicit agreement 
(Kanngiesser et al., 2017, Study 2). Overall, children display in their behavior in 
various ways the effects of having made a joint commitment to a partner. 
Another line of evidence suggesting that 3-year-old children understand the 
normative force of a joint commitment is their behavior when their partner reneges 
in some way. Kachel et al. (2018) presented pairs of 3-year-olds with a collaborative 
task involving a joint commitment (an adult got them to agree with each other that 
they would work together). Then, in one condition, one of them seemed to 
intentionally not play her role in the mutually known way (her deviant behavior 
was experimentally induced). In response, the partner very often protested, 
sometimes vigorously and often using normative language, for example, “No, you 
can't do it like that!” Children did not protest if the partner was seemingly ignorant 
of how the apparatus worked (in which case they often taught her) or if the 
apparatus accidentally broke. Similarly, Kanngiesser et al. (2017, Study 1) found 
that 3- and 5-year-old children responded to a collaborative partner's breaking of 
a promise (to share the spoils) with normative protest (which they did not do if no 
promise was given). Thus, 3-year-old children both feel a normative obligation to 
live up to their commitments and expect collaborative partners to live up to theirs 
as well.  
As noted above, an inviolable feature of joint commitments is that neither party 
to the agreement can dissolve it unilaterally; relatedly, if one does break the 
commitment, one owes the partner some kind of explanation, excuse, or apology. 
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Once again, children begin to display an understanding of this constraint around 
age 3. For example, Gräfenhain et al. (2009, Study 2) had a child and an adult 
make a joint commitment to play a game together. Then, another adult enticed the 
child away to a new, more attractive game. In response, 2-year-olds simply dropped 
everything and took off for the new game. But 3-year-olds understood their joint 
commitment; before taking off (if they did), they hesitated and looked to the adult 
and often did something overt to “take leave,” for example, handing over the tool 
used in the game or even verbally apologizing (much more than in the exact same 
situation with no prior joint commitment). It is not clear in this study whether 
children ever asked permission explicitly to break their joint commitment. But in 
this direction Banerjee, Bennett, & Luke, (2010) report that 4- to 9-year-old 
children thought that a transgressor deserved more punishment when he gave ‘no 
account’ than when he either gave an excuse or an apology. However, in this study 
there was no condition in which the transgressor asked permission before acting. 
In the current study, therefore, I was interested specifically in 3- and 5-year-
old children’s understanding of the importance of seeking permission to dissolve a 
joint commitment. An experimenter orchestrated a joint commitment between a 
child and a puppet partner in one of three between-subjects conditions. In one 
condition, the puppet partner gave a brief and neutral reason for breaking off (she 
had forgotten something) and then asked for the child’s okay to leave. In a second 
condition the puppet notified the child by stating the same brief reason and then 
left. In a third (baseline) condition, the puppet broke off the joint commitment 
abruptly by leaving without any communication whatsoever. In the puppet’s 
absence, in all three conditions, the child continued to work alone and then reaped 
the rewards of the activity by herself. I measured in each of these conditions how 
much children protested as the puppet was leaving, how long they waited for her 
return, and how much they wanted to share the rewards with her at the end (and 
also their answers to several other questions about the puppet and her behavior). 
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4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 144 children of heterogeneous socioeconomic backgrounds 
(predominantly Caucasian) attending preschool in a medium-sized German city. 
There were 72 3.5-year-olds (M = 41,7 months, SD =1,2; 36 boys) and 72 5.5-year-
olds (M = 65,6 months, SD =1,4; 36 boys). Prior to the study, parents had given 
informed consent for their children’s participation. Thirty-seven additional dyads 
were excluded from all analyses due to errors in the procedure or child 
uncooperativeness: experimenter error (n=8), camera malfunction (n=4), 
inattentiveness or disinclination of the subject child (n=7), fear of the puppet (n=2), 
fear to be alone in the test room (n=10), lack of agreement to the puppet’s asking 
permission to leave in the Dissolved condition (n=6). Twenty-eight additional 
children had to be excluded but only after the first and main dependent measure - 
protest against the puppet’s leaving - was taken (because they waited for the 
puppet’s return and never started collecting beads on their own). The main 
analyses will be done without them, but I additionally report their data on the first 
measure (in a footnote).   
4.2.2 Materials and Design 
Children were randomly assigned to one of three between-subjects conditions: 
Just Leave condition, Notify condition, and Dissolved condition. Children in all 
conditions played together with two same-sex, human-like puppet partners 
(animated by E2, who never gave instructions and only talked on behalf of the 
puppets): “Max” and “Paul” for boys and “Maxi” and “Paula” for girls. One puppet 
served as a main play partner and the other was presented as a potential future 
partner; which puppet played which role was counterbalanced across children.  
In all three conditions children and their puppet partners were trained to 
obtain wooden beads (in order to make a bracelet later) from an apparatus. The 
apparatus was a modified version of the Elevator task apparatus used by 
Warneken et al. (2006). As in the original apparatus, the goal of this task was to 
retrieve an object from the inside of a vertically movable cylinder. In order for one 
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player to successfully retrieve the object through an opening in the cylinder from 
one side of the apparatus (role A), a second player has to push up the cylinder from 
the other side of the apparatus (role B). It is impossible for one person to retrieve 
the object from the cylinder individually because transparent Plexiglass screens 
prevent reaching to the opening while pushing the cylinder up. In my version of 
the apparatus (Figure 10), there were three collaborative cylinders containing ten 
beads each (solvable only with a partner) and ten individually solvable cylinders 
containing one bead each (solvable individually without a partner because the 
openings were not covered by the Plexiglass screens).  
 
 
Figure 10 A 
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Figure 10 B 
 
Figure 10. Apparatus, adapted from the Elevator task (Warneken et al., 2006). The 
goal of this task is to retrieve colorful beads from the inside of a vertically movable 
cylinders. Transparent Plexiglass screens prevent reaching into the opening while 
pushing the cylinder up. There are (A) ten individually solvable cylinders 
containing one bead each (solvable without a partner) and (B) three collaborative 
cylinders containing ten beads each (solvable only with a partner). 
 
During a short warm-up phase, E1 introduced the child and the main puppet 
partner and asked them a series of questions that established similarities between 
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them (the child and the puppet were the same age, lived in the same city, and both 
liked to play in school). Then E1 asked them to jointly work on a coloring picture. 
To familiarize children with the fact that the puppet makes mistakes, and make 
them comfortable to protest when that happened, the puppet attempted to draw 
with the wrong end of the pencil. If children did not intervene spontaneously, E1 
prompted them to correct the puppet. 
4.2.3 Procedure 
Children were trained and tested in a quiet room in their preschool in a session 
lasting approximately 60 minutes. To begin, children were picked up in their 
classroom and brought to the test room by the lead experimenter. After the warm 
up with the main puppet, a second puppet (also played by E2) was introduced 
briefly. E1 pointed out that this puppet had played the game before and since only 
two players could play the game, the second puppet would sit and watch in the 
back. The second puppet only served as a potential future play partner. 
Training trial. E1 explained the elevator apparatus, starting with the 
individually solvable cylinders. The puppet and the child collected two beads each 
from the small individually solvable cylinders into a common collector. Then E1 
pointed out that there are much more beads in one of the big collaborative cylinders 
but that one cannot get them out alone. E1 asked the child to try to push up the 
cylinder and grab beads from the opening. After the child experienced that 
obtaining beads from the big collaborative cylinders alone was impossible, E1 
explained how the child and the puppet could retrieve beads together, and induced 
them to form a joint commitment (both had to agree to play together with an “okay” 
and high-five). The child then pushed up the big collaborative cylinder and the 
puppet collected the beads into the bead collector. To rebait the apparatus E1 then 
asked them to wait outside and color their picture some more. 
Test trial. Before the test trial began, E1 announced that she (and the second 
puppet who was watching the training trial) had to meet with the head of the 
preschool to discuss something and therefore could not be present during this 
round of the game. She also reminded the children and their puppet partners that 
Study 3: Three- and 5-year-old children’s understanding of how to dissolve a joint commitment 
 
 
84  
one could retrieve beads alone from the small individual cylinders, but that to use 
the big collaborative cylinders, they had to work together. Then she asked the child 
and the puppet to confirm a joint commitment again (high-five), and left. The 
puppet then suggested to get the beads from the big cylinders and that the child 
should push up the cylinders as in the training.  
When the child pushed up one of the collaborative cylinders and waited for the 
puppet to collect the beads, the puppet quit playing the game and left, by either: 
(1) telling the child that she had forgotten something and had to leave and asking 
whether it is okay (Dissolved condition – the children in this condition had to agree 
or the procedure was interrupted and E1 proceeded to making bracelets for the 
puppet and the child), (2) telling the child that she had forgotten something and 
had to leave (Notify condition), or (3) leaving the room without saying anything 
(Just Leave condition). In all three conditions, the puppet looked back to the child 
three times while walking out in order to give children a possibility to intervene. 
In the Dissolved condition the puppet also repeated the child’s approval of her 
leaving by saying “okay”, “alright then”, “good, I’m going” when looking back to the 
child.  
Then, in order for the procedure to continue, the children had to switch to the 
individual cylinders and collect the ten beads before E1 came back. If children did 
not start using the individual cylinders by themselves, E1 gave three consecutive 
prompts every 20 seconds through a crack in the door (pretending not to know that 
the puppet had left): “collect all beads, time is almost up”, “I’m almost done, hurry 
to collect all beads”, etc. If children did not collect the beads from the small 
cylinders E1 came back and progressed to the bracelet making. If children collected 
the beads, E1 came back, quietly looked into the room to give the child a chance to 
tattle spontaneously, and then continued with a series of prompts, pretending she 
did not know about the puppet’s leaving, to elicit tattling: “Oh, so many beads were 
collected”, “Oh, you two did such a good job”, “Great that you helped each other”.  
Then E1 asked the child about what happened and what the puppet had said 
while E1 was outside (“Did Max help collect the beads?”, “Did he tell you that he 
had to go?” “Did he ask for your okay?”) and finally, summarized the situation. 
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After that, E1 asked the children to decide whether she should scold the puppet 
for leaving and whether the puppet deserved to get a bracelet today. Then, E1 put 
two cups, one for the child and one for the puppet, next to the bead collector and 
told the children that they could distribute the beads in any way they wished while 
she had to leave the room again. When the children were done with the bead 
allocation, E1 came back and asked with whom they would like to play the game 
next time: the puppet they just played with or the one that was watching during 
training. Then they made bracelets from the collected beads. 
4.2.4 Coding and Reliability 
My main measure was the reactions of the child when the puppet quit the game 
and left the room. Children’s language was transcribed and coded for protest 
utterances. Utterances were coded as protest if they indicated that the child’s 
intention was to let the puppet know that her leaving the game was unsatisfactory, 
e.g., “No”, “What are you doing?”, “You have to push it up”, “But I can’t do it alone”. 
Then, I measured (in seconds) how long it took children to start to collect the beads 
from the individual cylinders and how long they waited for their puppet partner to 
come back. Next, I scored after how many prompts children tattled to E1 that the 
puppet had left the game (4 = spontaneous tattling, 3 = tattling after the first 
prompt from E1, 2 = tattling after the second prompt, 1 = tattling after the third 
prompt, 0 = no tattling). After that, I coded children’s decisions whether E1 should 
scold the puppet partner and whether the puppet deserved to get a bracelet. 
Furthermore, I counted how many of the ten beads collected in the test trial 
children gave to the puppet. Lastly, I coded whether they preferred to play with 
the same or the new puppet partner in the future.  
All of the sessions were videotaped and coded by a primary coder. To establish 
reliability, a second coder who was blind to the conditions and the hypotheses of 
the study coded a randomly selected sample of 20% of the data in each condition. 
The two coders were in very good to excellent agreement in the verbal and sharing 
measures (Cohen’s κ ranging between κ =0.87 and κ =1). For the duration measure, 
the correlation between coders was very high and significant (Spearman’s 
rho=0.997, p<0.001). 
Study 3: Three- and 5-year-old children’s understanding of how to dissolve a joint commitment 
 
 
86  
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Protest 
In the main analysis, I investigated whether children protested when the 
puppet quit the game and left the room. To model the impact of condition, age, 
gender and the interaction of condition and age, I used a Generalized Linear Model 
(GLM) with binomial error structure and logit link function (McCullagh & Nelder, 
1989). To establish the significance of the effect of the test predictors as a whole, I 
ran a likelihood ratio test (Dobson & Barnett, 2008), comparing the full model with 
a null model (Forstmeier & Schielzeth, 2011). Overall the full model provided a 
significantly better fit compared to the null model χ2(6) = 46.80, p < 0.001. The 
interaction of condition and age was not significant χ2(2) = 2.49, p = 0.29. 
Therefore, I dropped it from the analysis. The reduced model included condition, 
age, and gender and was significantly better at explaining the data than the null 
model χ2(4) = 44.30, p < 0.001. 
Of most importance, I found an effect of condition, χ2(2) = 37.07, p < 0.001, 
indicating that children protested more in the Just Leave condition than both in 
the Notify condition (estimate ± SE = -1.65 ± 0.47, z = -3.50, p < 0.001) and the 
Dissolved condition (estimate ± SE = -3.13 ± 0.63, z = -4.95, p < 0.001) (see Figure 
11). Also, they protested more in the Notify condition than in the Dissolved 
condition (estimate ± SE = 1.48 ± 0.63, z = 2.35, p < 0.05). These results suggest 
that preschool children already appreciate that a joint commitment can be 
dissolved by agreement, in which case the partner’s abandoning of the joint goal is 
excused. I also found an effect of age, χ2(1) = 9.48, p < 0.01, such that 3-year-old 
children protested more than did 5-year-old children (estimate ± SE = -0.65 ± 0.22, 
z = -2.95, p < 0.01), possibly because the 5-year-olds tended to assume that the 
puppet had a valid reason for leaving in all conditions.6 
                                               
6 Adding in the additional 28 children that had to be dropped from the rest measures provides very 
similar results: an effect of condition χ2(2) = 39.25, p < 0.001 with similar differences between 
conditions, and a similar effect of age χ2(1) = 6.40, p < 0.05 (details in the appendix). 
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Figure 11. Proportion of children’s protest towards the puppet while she was 
leaving. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
 
4.3.2 Latency before playing alone 
In my second model I analyzed how long children waited for the puppet partner 
to potentially come back and rejoin the game before they started to collect the 
beads from the individual cylinders. Prior to the analysis I log transformed the 
latency measure (seconds) to achieve an approximately symmetrical distribution. 
The GLM included condition, age, gender and the interaction of condition and age. 
Overall the full model provided a significantly better fit compared to the null model 
χ2(6) = 58.18, p < 0.001. The interaction of condition and age was not significant 
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χ2(2) = 1.54, p = 0.46. Therefore, I dropped it from the analysis. The reduced model 
included condition, age, and gender. The reduced model was significantly better at 
explaining the data than the null model χ2(4) = 56.39, p < 0.001. 
Again, I found an effect of condition χ2(2) = 21.56, p < 0.001, indicating that 
children waited longer for their puppet partners in both the Just Leave condition 
(estimate ± SE = 0.97 ± 0.22, z = 4.35, p < 0.001) and the Notify condition (estimate 
± SE = 0.85 ± 0.22, z = 3.79, p < 0.001) than in the Dissolved condition (see Figure 
12). This additionally demonstrates that children stopped considering a joint 
commitment as binding only after a mutually acknowledged cancellation of the 
agreement in the Dissolved condition, whereas they seemed to expect their partner 
to rejoin in the other two conditions. Furthermore, I found an effect of, age χ2(1) 
= 21.78, p = 0.001, indicating that 3-year-old children waited longer for their 
partner than did 5-year-old children (estimate ± SE = -0.44 ± 0.09, z = -4.77, p < 
0.001). Again, the 5-year-olds might just be quicker at assuming a valid reason for 
their partner’s behavior. 
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Figure 12. Mean duration (in seconds) that children waited for their partner to 
potentially come back before they started to collect the beads from the individually 
solvable cylinders on their own. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
 
4.3.3 Scold the puppet 
We also analyzed whether children wanted E1 to scold the puppet partner for 
leaving the game. Again, I used a GLM with binomial error structure and logit link 
function including condition, age, interaction of condition and age, and gender. 
Overall the full model provided a significantly better fit compared to the null model 
χ2(6) = 27.62, p < 0.001. The interaction of condition and age was not significant 
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χ2(2) = 3.98, p = 0.14. and was dropped from the analysis. The reduced model 
included condition, age and gender. The reduced model was significantly better at 
explaining the data than the null model χ2(4) = 23.63, p < 0.001. 
We found an effect of condition χ2(2) = 23.41, p < 0.001, indicating that children 
wanted E1 to scold the puppet more both in the Just Leave condition (estimate ± 
SE = 1.85 ± 0.46, z = 3.98, p < 0.001) and the Notify condition (estimate ± SE = 1.85 
± 0.46, z = 3.98, p < 0.001) than in the Dissolved condition (see Figure 13).  
 
Figure 13. Proportion of children who decided that E1 should scold the puppet for 
leaving the game. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
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4.3.4 Bracelet for the puppet 
Similarly, I analyzed whether children said that the puppet partner deserves 
to get a bracelet. Again, the full model provided a significantly better fit compared 
to the null model χ2(6) = 18.17, p < 0.01 but the interaction of condition and age 
was not significant χ2(2) = 0.08, p = 0.96. The reduced model was significantly 
better at explaining the data than the null model χ2(4) = 18.08, p < 0.01. 
The effect of condition, χ2(2) = 11.75, p < 0.01, indicated that children thought 
that the puppet deserves to get a bracelet more in the Dissolved condition than in 
both the Just Leave condition (estimate ± SE = -1.59 ± 0.51, z = -3.08, p < 0.01) and 
the Notify condition (estimate ± SE = -1.31 ± 0.52, z = -2.54, p < 0.05) (see Figure 
14). Furthermore, in this model I found an effect of age χ2(1) = 6.84, p = 0.01 
indicating that 3-year-old children’s decisions about giving a bracelet to the puppet 
partner were more generous than 5-year-olds’ decisions (estimate ± SE = -4.96 ± 
0.19, z = -2.56, p < 0.05). 
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Figure 14. Proportion of children who decided that their puppet partner deserves 
to get a bracelet at the end of the game. Error bars indicate standard error of the 
mean. 
 
4.3.5 Bead sharing and tattling 
We were also interested in how many beads children would give to the puppet 
and after how many prompts children tattled to E1 that the puppet had left the 
game. For both measures I used a logistic Generalized Linear Mixed Model 
(GLMM; Baayen, 2008) with condition, age, the interaction of condition and age, 
and gender as fixed effects. The full model did not provide a significantly better fit 
compared to the null model in either the bead sharing model χ2(6) = 8.11, p = 0.23. 
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or the tattling score model χ2(6) = 5.67, p = 0.46. Thus, none of the test predictors 
had an effect on either of these measures. 
4.3.6 Preferred future play partner 
Lastly, I analyzed whether children preferred to play with the same or the new 
(but familiar) puppet partner in the future. Again, I used a GLM with binomial 
error structure and logit link function including condition, age, interaction of 
condition and age, and gender. The full model did not provide a better fit compared 
to the null model χ2(6) = 5.56, p = 0.47; thus, none of the predictors had an effect 
on their choice of puppet.  
4.4 Discussion 
If choosing to collaborate means forgoing other opportunities, then there is risk 
involved. To help mitigate the risk, partners make a joint commitment, attempting 
to assure one another of their trustworthiness. In essence, they explicitly put their 
reputation as a cooperator on the line, declaring that if they were to behave non-
cooperatively, their partner could legitimately protest, and they would accept it as 
warranted. Joint commitments thus create a simple and direct normative bond 
between individuals in a particular social-interactive context (Gilbert, 2003). 
Previous research has shown that children as young as 3 years of age behave 
in special ways after they have formed a joint commitment with a partner. If the 
partner does not do his job as they both expect him to (common ground 
expectations), children of this age will protest - assuming that his misbehavior is 
not due to ignorance or to forces beyond his control (Kachel et al., 2018). If the 
partner does not share the spoils "fairly" at the end, again they protest (Warneken 
et al., 2011). Appreciating the legitimacy of the protest in such situations, children 
themselves tend to keep their joint commitments to play their role in a 
collaboration and to share the spoils in accordance with common ground 
expectations (Hamann et al., 2011; 2012). And they even "take leave”, by verbally 
explaining the situation to their partner, when they decide to do something else 
(Gräfenhain et al., 2009). 
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In the current study, I investigated children's understanding of the process by 
which one may cancel a joint commitment and its associated obligations altogether. 
When a puppet partner first made a joint commitment with the child, and then 
just abruptly up and left, they protested at a high level, waited for the partner’s 
return as if they could not believe that he could just quit, and judged that the 
puppet deserved censure (and no prize at the end). They clearly felt that the 
puppet’s behavior was unacceptable. In contrast, when the puppet either notified 
the child of her leaving or asked permission to leave, children protested less as the 
puppet was leaving, waited less for her return, and judged less often that the 
puppet deserved censure (and more often that she deserved a prize at the end). 
They protested least often when the puppet asked for, and the child granted, 
permission to dissolve the joint commitment. Interestingly, nullifying a normative 
agreement is not possible with social norms - whose breaking children of this age 
also protest (Rakoczy et al., 2008) - because their status as societal-level 
agreements means that children do not participate themselves in either creating 
or dissolving them. 
My interpretation of these results is that children understand that just as a 
joint commitment is created by agreement, it may be dissolved by agreement - or, 
to some lesser degree, by explicitly acknowledging the commitment and 
respectfully notifying the partner of one’s intention to break it. It is perhaps 
surprising that I found that the puppet actively dissolving the joint commitment 
by consent and simply notifying the child of her intention to break the commitment 
produced similar child behavior on three of the four most important dependent 
measures. One possibility is that notification is sufficient for dissolving a joint 
commitment in situations in which the permission of the partner is taken for 
granted. Thus, in everyday interactions adults break off from one another 
regularly by simply saying things like “Oh, see you later, I have to go pick up my 
child”.  They do indeed recognize that they need permission to break away (and in 
some cases they will ask for it), but in informal settings with a good excuse - 
conventionally recognized as a good excuse - notification suffices. Perhaps by 3 to 
5 years of age, children are already picking up on this to some degree. The point is 
that the underlying social dynamic in joint commitments is mutual respect among 
Study 3: Three- and 5-year-old children’s understanding of how to dissolve a joint commitment 
 
 
95  
partners. Asking permission is the ultimate expression of such respect, but 
notification suffices in some circumstances. Thus, when the puppet notifies the 
child of her intention to leave, this social act expresses to some significant degree 
an acknowledgment of and respect for the partner and their partnership, which is 
also the main function of asking permission.  
Surprisingly, I found that overall the 3-year-old children protested more and 
waited longer for their partner than did the 5-year-old children. I think it unlikely, 
although it is of course possible, that 3-year-olds consider joint commitments as 
somehow more binding then do 5-year-olds. More likely, as I speculated above, is 
the possibility that 5-year-olds have learned that people do not very often simply 
up and leave after they have committed to something, without some kind of good 
reason. The 3-year-olds have not yet made this generous inference, at least not as 
strongly, and so they are more upset about the leaving in all conditions. 
The current study thus contributes to the growing body of research suggesting 
that for the first time at around 3 years of age young children appreciate the 
normative force of joint commitments (see Tomasello, in press, for a review). 
Because they are forming joint commitments not only with adults but also with 
peers and puppets, it is unlikely that they believe the force is coming from some 
authority vested in their partner. Rather, they understand that it is coming from 
the agreement they have made with their partner. The current results bolster this 
interpretation by showing that just as joint commitments are made by agreement, 
they may be dissolved by agreement – or some other respectful act such as 
notification - among those same parties as well. 
4.5 Appendix 
Children’s protest towards the leaving puppet (including the dropped subject 
children) 
Twenty-eight additional children had to be excluded after the first and main 
dependent measure (children’s protest when the puppet quit the game and left the 
room) because they waited for the puppet’s return and never started collecting 
beads on their own. Including these children in the main analysis provides very 
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similar results to the analysis without these children. Overall the full model 
provided a significantly better fit compared to the null model χ2(6) = 46.50, 
p < 0.001. The interaction of condition and age was not significant χ2(2) = 2.51, 
p = 0.28. Therefore, I dropped it from the analysis. The reduced model included 
condition, age, and gender and was significantly better at explaining the data than 
the null model χ2(4) = 43.98, p < 0.001. 
We found an effect of condition, χ2(2) = 39.25, p < 0.001, indicating that children 
protested more in the Just Leave condition than both in the Notify condition 
(estimate ± SE = -1.38 ± 0.41, z = -3.33, p < 0.001) and the Dissolved condition 
(estimate ± SE = -3.03 ± 0.60, z = -5.07, p < 0.001) (see Figure A1). Also, children 
protested more in the Notify condition than in the Dissolved condition (estimate ± 
SE = 1.66 ± 0.60, z = 2.75, p < 0.01). I also found an effect of age, χ2(1) = 6.40, 
p < 0.05, such that 3-year-old children protested more than did 5-year-old children 
(estimate ± SE = -0.65 ± 0.22, z = -2.95, p < 0.01). 
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Figure A1. Proportion of children’s protest towards the puppet while she was 
leaving. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. 
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Summary 
Without doubt human beings can achieve greater goals in cooperation than on 
their own. This is the case for simple instrumental scenarios like being able to 
move something that is too heavy to lift for a single person, but also on a much 
greater and broader scale when thinking about how much we rely on other’s 
cooperation in modern societies. There are numerous investigations, empirically 
and philosophically, that address the unique magnitude of human’s ability to 
coordinate, cooperate and form commitments with other individuals which 
undoubtedly is one of the most remarkable competencies of human beings, 
distinguishing us from any other species (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a; Melis & 
Semmann, 2010; Rand & Nowak, 2013; Tomasello, 2009; Tomasello, 2016). 
Evolutionarily, collaborative hunting have been discussed repeatedly as a possible 
origin for uniquely human cooperation (Alvard, 2003; Bramble & Lieberman, 2004; 
Hill, 2002; Liebenberg, 2008; Tomasello et al., 2012). This dissertation specifically 
focuses on Tomasello’s account, namely the Interdependence Hypotheses 
(Tomasello et al., 2012; Tomasello & Vaish, 2013; Tomasello, 2016) which 
postulates two phylogenetic steps (and also two ontogenetic steps) for the 
development of uniquely human cooperation. The first step entails a small-scale 
interdependence with immediate foraging partners and consequentially 
developing competencies for mutual cooperation. In the second step, the newly 
appropriated skills for collaboration were scaled up to group wide conventions and 
norms. Thus, it is likely that our cooperative mind-set - evolutionarily turned this 
way - in a great measure contributed to the prosperousness of the human species. 
However, there are also risks that lie in cooperation. A collaborative partner might 
be tempted to abandon the joint endeavor when his preferences change, that is he 
could turn to a more profitable option for himself. Thus, the previously shared goal 
is lost again and resources that were already invested are put to waste. To reduce 
the risks and the uncertainty that lie within such collaborative interactions with 
others, people often form joint commitments. Joint commitments can help to 
structure and facilitate cooperation (Michael et al., 2016a) and make other’s 
behavior in cooperative contexts more predictable (Michael & Pacherie, 2015). 
Furthermore, they go along with normative obligations to act in accordance with 
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the joint activity that one committed oneself to as well as the right to rebuke one’s 
partner in case he is not acting in the appropriate manner (Gilbert 1990; 2009). 
Thus, joint commitments might prevent individuals from giving in to temptations 
which in turn strengthens the reliance on commitments. The concept of joint 
commitment and even more the notion of cooperation also have been investigated 
developmentally. Thus, young children become increasingly skillful at cooperating 
with adults and peers starting at 2 years of age (Brownell & Carriger, 1990; 
Brownell & Carriger, 1991; Brownell et al., 2006; Warneken et al., 2006; Warneken 
et al., 2012; Warneken et al., 2007; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007) and seem 
to develop an understanding of joint commitments and promises at around 3 to 5 
years of age (Gräfenhain et al., 2009; Gräfenhain et al., 2013; Hamann et al., 2014; 
Hamann et al., 2011; Hamann et al., 2012; Heyman et al., 2015; Kanngiesser et 
al., 2017; Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012; Warneken et al., 2011).  
However, there are various shortcomings to previous research. Most studies 
haven’t systematically investigated the role of joint commitments in collaborative 
activities. The commitments have occasionally been explicit but mostly arose from 
the pragmatics of the situation. Most importantly, studies with peers are rare and 
children’s behavior with adults in collaborative activities might always be 
influenced by the authority of the adult. There are also previous findings 
suggesting that it is not until about 9 years of age that children understand 
commitments and promises (Astington, 1988; Lyon & Evans, 2014; Mant & Perner, 
1988).  Developmentally, it might also make a difference for children’s adherence 
to commitments whether they owe it to a partner or whether it is owed to them. As 
of now, no study has looked at what children know about the dissolvability of joint 
commitments and how they react when their collaborative partner disengages 
from his or her obligations depending on how their partner previously terminated 
the agreement. The three studies included in this dissertation are an attempt to 
shed light on these issues. 
 
 
Summary 
 
 
100  
Study 1 – Three-Year-Olds’ Reactions to a Partner’s Failure to Perform Her 
Role in a Joint Commitment   
When investigating young children’s understanding of joint commitments, 
previous research has focused on how children behave towards their partner after 
they have collaborated compared to when they have not, namely on sharing the 
spoils of collaboration or helping (Gräfenhain et al., 2013; Hamann et al., 2011; 
Hamann et al., 2012). So far, no study has investigated whether children consider 
it a normative obligation to fulfil one’s role as a committed partner in a 
collaborative activity. Furthermore, it is not clear whether children might 
acknowledge circumstances that can release one from such obligations as it is the 
case in adults (Mathew & Boyd, 2014). Thus, in the first study of this thesis, dyads 
of 3-year-old children were invited to form an explicit joint commitment to play a 
game. One child in each dyad was trained as a naïve confederate and defected from 
the joint activity. The other children were subjects and their reactions towards 
their partner’s defection was measured. In three different conditions the stooge 
child abandoned the joint goal in the middle of their performance either because 
(i) the stooge child intentionally and selfishly defected to get a reward for himself 
(the Selfish condition); (ii) the stooge child acted incompetent when trying to play 
his role (the Ignorant condition); or (iii) a part of the apparatus broke when the 
stooge child tried to operate it (the Accidental condition). The main measure was 
children’s protest towards their defecting partner. Furthermore, their teaching 
behavior, emotional arousal and tattling on their partner were measured. The 
results showed that children reacted differently across the three conditions. When 
their partner abandoned them to obtain a reward for himself, subject children 
reacted with normative protest and a high emotional arousal. When tattling to the 
experimenter, they also blamed their partner. In the Ignorant condition, where 
their partner appeared willing but incompetent, children reacted with less protest 
and emotional arousal but showed teaching behavior towards their partner. In the 
Accidental condition, there was almost no protest behavior or increased arousal 
and when tattling, children blamed the apparatus, not their partner. Taken 
together, the results from Study 1 suggest that by 3 years of age, children are not 
only competent cooperators and take commitments into account when it comes to 
Summary 
 
 
101  
the outcome of collaboration, but that they also make appropriate normative 
evaluations of intentions and obligations of collaborative partners when 
performing their role. 
 
Study 2 - Three- and 5-year-old children’s adherence to explicit and implicit joint 
commitments 
When deciding whether to adhere to a commitment (or a promise) it certainly 
can make a difference whether one owes it to someone or whether it is owed to 
oneself. Developmentally, it might be especially hard for younger children to resist 
temptations to defect when they have to suppress their selfish interests (e.g., when 
they have the option to obtain a quantitatively or qualitatively better reward). On 
the other hand, it should be easier to uphold the value of commitments when it is 
in line with their selfish interests (e.g., when their partner wants to abandon them 
for a better option). Previous research shows that children seem to develop an 
understanding of joint commitments and promises at around 3 to 5 years of age 
(Gräfenhain et al., 2009; Hamann et al., 2014; Hamann et al., 2011; Hamann et 
al., 2012; Heyman et al., 2015; Kanngiesser et al., 2017; Kanngiesser & Warneken, 
2012; Warneken et al., 2011). However, there are also studies suggesting that it is 
not until about 9 years of age that children understand commitments and promises 
(Astington, 1988; Lyon & Evans, 2014; Mant & Perner, 1988).  
In study two, dyads of 3-year-old and 5-year-old children played a collaborative 
game where they could collect beads. Only one child in each dyad was the subject, 
the other child served as a naive conferderate. At test, subject children were bribed 
to abandon the collaboration by offering them more beads individually than they 
could win by collaborating with their partner. In three different conditions, the 
level of the commitment between subject children and their stooge partner was 
manipulated. In the Implicit commitment condition, subject children knew that 
their collaborative partner depended on them to obtain beads. In the Explicit 
commitment condition, subject children again knew that their collaborative 
partner depended on them. In addition, they formed an explicit joint commitment 
with their partner to play together. Lastly, in the Parallel-play condition, subject 
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children knew that their partner did not depend on them and could obtain beads 
by himself.  
The results showed that by 3 years of age children were more likely to resist 
the bribe after they had formed an explicit joint commitment to their partner 
compared to  when they were only playing in parallel. Their reactions to an implicit 
commitment were falling in between. By 5 years of age children were more likely 
to resist bribes in both the Implicit and Explicit commitment conditions compared 
to the Parallel-play condition. Thus, after forming an explicit joint commitment 
with a partner, both 3- and 5-year-old children stood by the obligation to their 
commitment in the face on an attractive alternative option. However, only 5-year-
olds understood a partner’s dependence as a binding obligation. 
Study 3 - Three- and 5-year-old children’s understanding of how to dissolve a joint 
commitment 
Previous research has shown that by 3 years of age children begin to 
understand that obligations are created when they form a joint commitment with 
a partner (Gräfenhain et al., 2009; Kachel et al., 2018; Kachel & Tomasello 2018). 
Gräfenhain and colleagues have shown that 3- and 4-year-old children show some 
leave taking behavior, when lured away from their joint activity with an adult 
partner after they had made a joint commitment to play compared to when they 
had not (Gräfenhain et al., 2009, Study 2). However, no previous study has 
investigated children’s reactions when their collaborative partner disengages from 
his or her obligation depending on how their partner previously terminated the 
agreement. Thus, 3- and 5-year-old children formed a joint commitment with a 
puppet partner to play a collaborative game. At test, the puppet then broke off 
from the joint activity dissolving the previously formed commitment in three 
different conditions. In the Dissolved condition, the puppet gave a short and 
neutral reason (she had forgotten something) and asked for the child’s permission 
to break off (children in this condition had to agree or were not included in the 
analysis), in the Notify condition the puppet informed the child of its leaving by 
stating the same short, neural reason as in the Dissolved condition but did not 
additionally ask for Children’s okay; and in a third condition (the Just Leave 
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condition) the puppet left abruptly without saying anything to the child. Results 
of this study showed, that children of both age groups protested more, were more 
resentful (with regard to the puppets deservingness of a price and censure) and 
waited less for their partner’s return when the puppet left abruptly than in the 
other two conditions. Thus, both 3- and 5-year-old children understand that joint 
commitments, and the obligations that result from them, may be abolished by a 
mutual agreement and to a lesser extent, by notification.  
Taken together, the empirical studies presented in this dissertation 
demonstrate that at 3 years of age children understand the obligations that lie 
within an explicit joint commitment both when it is owed to them and when they 
owe it to a partner. Thus, it is in line with previous studies which report a 
substantial increase in children’s abilities regarding joint commitments starting 
by 3 years of age (Gräfenhain et al., 2009; Hamann et al., 2014; Hamann et al., 
2011; Hamann et al., 2012; Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012; Warneken et al., 
2011). Adherence to implicit and situational commitments is more difficult for 
young children, especially when they owe it to a partner and was found only at 5 
years of age. Lastly, beginning at 3 years of age children not only seem to adhere 
to joint commitments made by agreement, but they also acknowledge that they 
may be dissolved by agreement. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Zweifellos können Menschen durch Zusammenarbeit und Kooperation Dinge 
erreichen, die man als einzelnes Individuum nicht schaffen kann. Dies trifft sowohl 
auf einfache instrumentelle Szenarien zu (z.B., dass man gemeinsam einen 
schweren Gegenstand bewegen kann, den man allein nicht zu heben vermag) als 
auch, wenn man die geradezu allumfassende und grundlegende Vielfalt an 
kooperativer Zusammenarbeit in unserer modernen Gesellschaft in Betracht zieht. 
Unzählige Untersuchungen sowohl empirischer als auch philosophischer Natur, 
heben hervor, dass das Ausmaß menschlicher Fähigkeiten im kooperativen 
Bereich einzigartig ist (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004a; Melis & Semmann, 2010; Rand 
& Nowak, 2013; Tomasello, 2009; Tomasello, 2016). Aus evolutionärer Perspektive 
wird vielfach die Notwendigkeit des kollaborativen Jagens als Ursprung dieser 
einzigartigen menschlichen Fähigkeiten angeführt (Alvard, 2003; Bramble & 
Lieberman, 2004; Hill, 2002; Liebenberg, 2008; Tomasello et al., 2012). Im Rahmen 
dieser Dissertation wird die Interdependence Hypothese – Die Hypothese von 
Gegenseitiger Abhängigkeit nach Tomasello fokussiert (Tomasello et al., 2012; 
Tomasello & Vaish, 2013; Tomasello, 2016). Tomasello postuliert eine zwei-Stufen-
Entwicklung menschlicher Moral und Kooperation sowohl auf phylogenetischer, 
als auch auf ontogenetischer Ebene. Der erste Schritt beinhaltet eine gegenseitige 
Abhängigkeit direkter Interaktionspartner. Dabei werden voneinander abhängige 
Partner (z.B., Jagdpartner) zunehmend kompetenter darin wechselseitig lukrative 
Kooperationen einzugehen und aufrecht zu erhalten. Im zweiten Schritt werden 
diese Kompetenzen dann von der kleinformatigen Kooperation zwischen 
bestimmten Personen auf eine höhere und weitreichendere Ebene, nämlich auf 
eine Gruppen- bis hin zu einer Gesellschaftlichen Ebene mit Normen, 
Konventionen und Gesetzen, ausgeweitet. Demnach ist es also unsere evolutionär 
auf Kooperation eingestellte Geisteshaltung, die zum großen Teil den Erfolg und 
das Gedeihen der menschlichen Spezies, ausmachen könnte. Es sind allerdings 
immer auch gewisse Risiken mit gegenseitiger Abhängigkeit und Kooperation 
verbunden. So können sich die Präferenzen des Kooperationspartners 
beispielsweise jederzeit ändern, wenn sich eine für ihn profitablere Option auftut. 
In diesem Fall wäre das vorherige gemeinsame Ziel verloren und alle bereits 
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investierten Ressourcen wären verschwendet. Um genau solche Risiken und 
Unsicherheiten zu vermeiden, schließen Menschen oft Vereinbarungen 
miteinander ab. Solche verbindlichen Abmachungen können helfen kooperatives 
Verhalten zu strukturieren, zu unterstützen (Michael et al., 2016a) und das 
Verhalten von Kooperationspartnern vorhersagbarer zu machen (Michael & 
Pacherie, 2015). Zusätzlich scheinen sie sogar mit einem normativen 
Verpflichtungsgefühl und Schuldigkeit einherzugehen (Gilbert 1990; 2009). 
Betrachtet man Kooperationsfähigkeiten entwicklungspsychologisch, deuten viele 
Studien darauf hin, dass Kinder ab einem Alter von zwei Jahren starke 
Fortschritte machen, zuerst in der Interaktion mit Erwachsenen, etwas später 
auch mit Gleichaltrigen (Brownell & Carriger, 1990; Brownell & Carriger, 1991; 
Brownell et al., 2006; Warneken et al., 2006; Warneken et al., 2012; Warneken et 
al., 2007; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007). Ein Verständnis über verbindliche 
Abmachungen und das Konzept von Versprechen scheint sich zwischen dem 
dritten und den fünften Lebensjahren zu entwickeln (Gräfenhain et al., 2009; 
Gräfenhain et al., 2013; Hamann et al., 2014; Hamann et al., 2011; Hamann et al., 
2012; Heyman et al., 2015; Kanngiesser et al., 2017; Kanngiesser & Warneken, 
2012; Warneken et al., 2011). Bisherige Studien haben das kindliche Verständnis 
solcher Vereinbarungen jedoch eher unsystematisch und unvollständig betrachtet. 
Es gibt außerdem widersprechende Befunde, die darauf hindeuten, dass Kinder 
erst ab dem neunten Lebensjahr feste Abmachungen und Versprechen verstehen 
(Astington, 1988; Lyon & Evans, 2014; Mant & Perner, 1988). Es ist ferner 
denkbar, dass besonders jüngere Kinder Vereinbarungen einen größeren Wert 
beimessen, wenn sie selbst davon profitieren als wenn sie anderen gegenüber in 
der Pflicht stehen. Des Weiteren gibt es derzeit keine Untersuchungen dazu, was 
Kinder darüber wissen, dass Abmachungen zurückgezogen werden können oder 
wie sie darauf reagieren, wenn ein Kooperationspartner sich aus seinen 
Verpflichtungen auf verschiedene Art und Weise zurückzieht. Die drei 
empirischen Studien dieser Dissertation sollen helfen diesen Fragen auf den 
Grund zu gehen.  
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Studie 1 – Wie reagieren dreijährige, wenn ein Kooperationspartner seinen 
Beitrag für die Erreichung eines gemeinsamen Zieles nicht leistet? 
 
In der Betrachtung des kindlichen Verständnisses verbindlicher Abmachungen 
haben bisherige Arbeiten sich darauf konzentriert, wie sich Kinder im Anschluss 
an eine kollaborative Tätigkeit gegenüber ihrem Kooperationspartner verhalten. 
Insbesondere wurde betrachtet, wie sie erarbeitete Erträge aufteilen und ob sie 
ihrem Partner helfen (Gräfenhain et al., 2013; Hamann et al., 2011; Hamann et 
al., 2012). Bisher hat jedoch keine Studie betrachtet, ob Kinder im Zusammenhang 
mit verbindlichen Abmachungen eine normative Schuldigkeit im Sinne einer 
Verpflichtung zur Erfüllung der Rolle als Kooperationspartner empfinden (das 
heißt, das zu tuen was nötig ist, damit das gemeinsame Ziel erreicht werden kann). 
Außerdem ist unklar, ob auch Kinder ähnlich wie Erwachsene erkennen, dass es 
bestimmte Umstände gibt, die einen von Verpflichtungen befreien können 
(Mathew & Boyd, 2014).  
In der ersten Studie dieser Dissertation wurden Paare von dreijährigen 
Kindern dazu gebracht eine Vereinbarung zu einem kooperativen Spiel zu treffen. 
Eines der Kinder in jeder Dyade wurde – ohne dies zu wissen – angeleitet seinen 
Teil operativen Aktivität nicht zu erfüllen. Das jeweils andere Kind der Dyade 
fungierte als eigentliche Versuchsperson. Gegenstand der Untersuchung waren 
die Reaktionen auf das Versagen des Partners. In drei verschiedenen Bedingungen 
wurde experimentell manipuliert aus welchem Grund das Helferkind das 
Versuchskind in der gemeinsamen Aktivität im Stich ließ. In der selbstsüchtigen-
Bedingung wendete sich das Helferkind scheinbar absichtlich und eigennützig von 
dem gemeinsamen Spiel ab, um einen kleinen Preis für sich selbst zu bekommen. 
In der inkompetenten-Bedingung erfüllte das Helferkind seinen Beitrag nicht, da 
es sich zu ungeschickt anstellte und in der Unfall-Bedingung erfüllte das 
Helferkind seinen Beitrag nicht, weil ein Teil der Spielapparatur kaputt ging. Das 
Hauptmaß der Studie war der verbale Protest der Versuchskinder. Des Weiteren 
wurden auch pädagogische Verhaltensweisen, emotionale Erregtheit und 
anschließendes Petzen betrachtet. Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeigen, dass die 
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Kinder in den drei verschiedenen Versuchsbedingungen unterschiedlich auf das 
Verhalten des Helferkindes reagierten. Wenn ihr Partner sie aus selbstsüchtigem 
Interesse im Stich ließ, reagierten die Kinder mit normativem Protest, einer hohen 
emotionale Erregtheit und beschuldigten das Helferkind, wenn sie später petzten. 
Wenn ihr Partner sie wegen seiner Inkompetenz hängen ließ, reagierten die 
Kinder mit weniger Protest, sondern versuchten dem Partner pädagogische 
Hilfestellung zu geben. In der letzten Bedingung, bei der das Helferkind wegen 
einer kaputten Apparatur nicht weiterspielen konnte, protestierten die 
Versuchskinder am wenigsten und beschwerten sich beim Petzen über die 
Apparatur, nicht aber über ihren Partner. Zusammenfassend, deuten die 
Ergebnisse der ersten Studie darauf hin, dass Kinder im Alter von drei Jahren 
nicht nur kompetente Kooperationspartner sein können, sondern dass sie auch 
angemessene normative Bewertungen hinsichtlich der Verpflichtung ihrer 
Kooperationspartner und dessen Rollenerfüllung in der gemeinsamen 
Zusammenarbeit vornehmen können.  
Studie 2 – Die Einhaltung von explizit- und implizit abgemachten Vereinbarung 
in drei- und fünfjährigen Kindern 
Bei der Entscheidung, ob eine Abmachung oder ein Versprechen einzuhalten 
ist oder nicht, ist es durchaus denkbar, dass es einen Unterschied macht ob man 
selbst jemand anderem gegenüber in der Pflicht ist oder ob das Gegenüber einem 
etwas schuldig ist. Besonders für junge Kinder kann es schwierig sein einer 
Versuchung zugunsten einer zuvor getroffenen Vereinbarung zu widerstehen. Auf 
der anderen Seite ist es für Kinder sicher einfacher, die Einhaltung von 
Abmachungen und Versprechen einzufordern, wenn dies mit ihren Interessen 
übereinstimmt (z.B., gegenüber einem zur Partner der verlockt ist sie im Stich zu 
lassen). Bisherige Studien deuten darauf hin, dass Kinder zwischen dem dritten 
und dem fünften Lebensjahr zunehmend ein Verständnis über verbindliche 
Abmachungen und das Konzept von Versprechen entwickeln (Gräfenhain et al., 
2009; Hamann et al., 2014; Hamann et al., 2011; Hamann et al., 2012; Heyman et 
al., 2015; Kanngiesser et al., 2017; Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012; Warneken et 
al., 2011). Es gibt allerdings auch widersprechende Befunde, die darauf hindeuten, 
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dass es Kinder nicht vor dem neunten Lebensjahr gelingt, feste Abmachungen und 
Versprechen voll zu verstehen (Astington, 1988; Lyon & Evans, 2014; Mant & 
Perner, 1988). In der zweiten Studie spielten Paare von dreijährigen und 
fünfjährigen Kindern ein kollaboratives Spiel in welchen sie Perlen sammeln 
konnten. Eines der Kinder in jeder Dyade war das eigentliche Versuchskind, das 
andere Kind wurde unwissend als Helferkind eingesetzt. Während der 
Testsituation wurde das Versuchskind bestochen die Kooperation mit dem 
Helferkind einzustellen (es wurde ihnen angeboten mehr Perlen für sich selbst zu 
bekommen indem sie nicht mehr mit dem Partner zusammenspielten). In drei 
verschiedenen Bedingungen wurde experimentell manipuliert, wie eng die 
verbindliche Abmachung, gemeinsam zu spielen, zwischen beiden Kindern war. In 
einer Bedingung mit einer indirekten Vereinbarung zur Kooperation lernten die 
Versuchskinder, dass ihr Partner zwingend ihre Hilfe braucht, um Perlen aus der 
Spielapparatur sammeln zu können. Das heißt ohne ihre Hilfe bekamen die 
Helferkinder nichts. In einer weiteren Bedingung mit einer direkten, 
ausdrücklichen Vereinbarung zur Kooperation lernten die Versuchskinder wie in 
der vorherigen Bedingung, dass ihr Partner ohne sie keine Perlen aus der 
Spielapparatur sammeln kann. Zusätzlich dazu vereinbarten sie verbal ganz 
explizit, dass sie gemeinsam spielen würden. In der dritten Bedingung (Paralleles-
Spiel Bedingung) lernten die Versuchskinder, dass ihr Partner allein und ohne 
ihre Hilfe Perlen aus der Spielapparatur sammeln konnte und nicht von ihnen 
abhängig war. Die Ergebnisse der zweiten Studie zeigen, dass Kinder im Alter von 
drei Jahren der angebotenen Bestechung mehr widerstehen konnten nachdem sie 
eine explizite ausdrückliche Vereinbarung mit ihrem Spielpartner vereinbart 
hatten als wenn ihr Partner ohne ihre Hilfe Perlen aus der Apparatur holen 
konnte. Im Alter von fünf Jahren waren Kinder sowohl in der Bedingung mit einer 
direkten, ausdrücklichen Vereinbarung zur Kooperation, als auch in der 
Bedingung mit einer indirekten Vereinbarung in der Lage Verlockungen zu 
widerstehen und sich an ihre Vereinbarung zu halten. Zusammenfassend deuten 
die Ergebnisse der zweiten Studie darauf hin, dass nach einer direkten, 
ausdrücklichen Vereinbarung zu kooperieren, sowohl Kinder im Alter von fünf als 
auch drei Jahren zu der Verpflichtung, die sie eingegangen sind, stehen auch wenn 
sich ihnen eine bessere Alternative eröffnet. War die Vereinbarung lediglich 
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indirekt, also lediglich gekennzeichnet durch eine Abhängigkeit des 
Kooperationspartners, widerstanden nur die Fünfjährigen der Verlockung 
zuverlässig.  
Studie 3 – Das Verständnis von drei- und fünfjährigen Kindern darüber, wie 
Abmachungen widerrufen werden können 
Vorangegangene Studien zeigen, dass Kinder ab einem Alter von drei Jahren 
begreifen, dass mit dem Abschließen von Vereinbarungen auch Verpflichtungen 
einhergehen (Gräfenhain et al., 2009; Kachel et al., 2018; Kachel & Tomasello, 
2018). Gräfenhain und Kollegen haben gezeigt, dass Kinder im Alter von drei und 
vier Jahren eine Art verabschiedendes- und entschuldigendes Verhalten 
gegenüber einem Kooperationspartner zeigen, bevor sie zu einem attraktiveren 
Spiel wechselten, wenn sie mit diesem Partner zuvor eine Abmachung getroffen 
hatten. In Situationen in denen der Partner einfach ungefragt mit ihnen 
zusammen spielt trat dieses Verhalten nicht auf (Gräfenhain et al., 2009; Study 
2). Bisher hat jedoch keine Studie betrachtet, ob die Art der Aufkündigung einer 
Abmachung für Kinder einen relevanten Unterschied macht.  
In der dritten Studie vereinbarten drei- und fünfjährige Kinder mit einer Puppe 
gemeinsam ein kooperatives Spiel zu spielen. In der Testsituation brach die Puppe 
die Kooperation jedoch ab und verließ das Spiel. Dabei hatte die Puppe in drei 
unterschiedlichen Bedingungen die zuvor getroffene Vereinbarung aufgelöst. In 
einer Bedingung hat sich die Puppe mit einer kurzen und wertneutralen 
Begründung verabschiedet (sie hatte etwas vergessen). Zusätzlich hat sie sich die 
Erlaubnis des Kindes geben lassen nun die Situation verlassen zu dürfen 
(Bedingung mit Abschied und Einverständnis). In einer weiteren Bedingung hat 
sich die Puppe mit der gleichen Begründung entschuldigt, sich jedoch nicht 
zusätzlich das Einverständnis des Kindes geben lassen (Bedingung mit Abschied).  
In der dritten Bedingung hat die Puppe das Spiel einfach verlassen ohne dem Kind 
etwas zu sagen (Bedingung ohne Abschied). Die Ergebnisse der dritten Studie 
zeigen, dass Kinder beider Altersgruppen mehr gegen das Verhalten der Puppe 
protestierten, nachtragender waren (beim Verteilen von Tadel und Preisen nach 
dem Spiel) und länger auf eine mögliche Rückkehr der Puppe warteten, wenn die 
Zusammenfassung 
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Puppe das Spiel ohne jegliche Mitteilung verlassen hatte. Folglich haben sowohl 
Kinder im Alter von fünf als auch drei Jahren verstanden, dass verbindliche 
Vereinbarungen und die daraus resultierenden Verpflichtungen nach beidseitiger 
Zustimmung oder auch durch einseitige Mitteilung aufgekündigt werden können.  
Zusammengenommen stützen die Studien der vorliegenden Dissertation 
Befunde bisheriger Studien welche nahelegen, dass Kinder bereits ab einem Alter 
von drei Jahren ein Verständnis davon entwickeln, dass explizite verbindliche 
Abmachungen mit Verpflichtungen einhergehen. Bei der Bewertung der Situation 
scheint es für die Kinder keine Rolle zu spielen, ob sie selbst in der Schuld stehen 
oder andere ihnen etwas schuldig sind. Die Ergebnisse untermauern also bisherige 
Befunde, nach denen sich das kindliche Verständnis von Vereinbarungen und 
Versprechen zwischen dem dritten und fünften Lebensjahr entwickelt (Gräfenhain 
et al., 2009; Hamann et al., 2014; Hamann et al., 2011; Hamann et al., 2012; 
Kanngiesser & Warneken, 2012; Warneken et al., 2011). Bereits ab drei Jahren 
beginnen Kinder nicht nur Verbindlichkeiten aus Abmachungen zu verstehen, 
sondern auch dass diese Abmachung und die daraus resultierenden 
Verbindlichkeiten aufgekündigt werden können. Eine Wertschätzung von 
situationalen und impliziten Vereinbarungen und Abhängigkeiten fällt jüngeren 
Kindern dagegen schwerer und zeigt sich erst in einem Alter von fünf Jahren. 
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